Trade of Asia
In ancient times, regions of Asia had commercial relations among themselves as well as with parts of Europe and Africa. In the earliest days nomadic peoples traded over considerable distances, using barter as the medium of exchange. Particularly important in such trade were fine textiles, silk, gold and other metals, various precious and semiprecious stones, and spices and aromatic products. Trade between Europe and Asia expanded considerably during the Greek era (about the 4th century bce ), by which time various land routes had been well established connecting Greece, via Anatolia (Asia Minor), with the northwestern part of the Indian subcontinent. Further development of land and sea routes from the Mediterranean basin, especially to southern India, occurred during Roman times. This east-west trade flourished in the first four centuries ce but was subject to considerable vicissitudes in later centuries. During that period trade also expanded considerably to Southeast Asia and to China through what are now Malaysia and Cambodia.
After Spain and Portugal, in the 15th century, became interested in discovering a direct sea route to Asia—an interest that led to the European discovery of the Western Hemisphere—the era of the great circumnavigators arrived in the 16th century. Portugal was one of the first countries to attempt to establish a monopoly over the lucrative spice trade with the East, and it founded a network of trading outposts in Asia. The Spanish, meanwhile, established control over the Philippines. The Dutch and the British started similar enterprises at the beginning of the 17th century, each country establishing its own East India company. The British began by centring their activities on the Indian subcontinent and extended their control to Burma (now Myanmar), Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), and Malaysia. The Dutch first concentrated on Ceylon but later expanded into and concentrated on Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia. The French were able to establish only minor footholds on the Indian subcontinent, but their 19th-century penetration of the Indochinese Peninsula was more successful. Over time these European trading companies developed into colonial empires.
The East India companies of Europe came seeking the exotic products of Asia: silks, cottons, and precious commodities such as spices and aromatic products. These products required the skilled labour of weavers and farmers or soil and climatic conditions unique to the region.
As the East India companies developed and imposed colonial rule, a new pattern of trade emerged. Generally speaking, the colonial countries became the exporters of raw materials and imported the finished products from their colonial rulers. For example, Britain ceased importing finished cotton goods from India and instead imported raw cotton to be spun and woven in the new industrial mills. Cotton cloth was then exported back to India, where indigenous weavers lost their employment. Steel products from cutlery to railway locomotives were exported to Asian countries from Europe. During that period tea and tobacco also entered into international trade, and jute became a monopoly product of the Indian subcontinent. After the British went to war with China to block Chinese efforts to ban opium imports, opium was traded legally by British merchants from India to China and was a source of tax revenue for the government of India. From the 17th to the second half of the 19th century, Japan had limited trading relations primarily with Korea and China and prohibited trade with Western countries apart from a small Dutch trading post in southern Japan.
The latter half of the 19th century and the early part of the 20th constituted the heyday of colonial rule. By the first decade of the 20th century, Japan had emerged as a major military and naval power, and it gradually developed into an important trading partner with the rest of the world. The era that followed was that of the colonies’ struggle for political independence, which reached its climax immediately after World War II. Less than two decades after the end of the war, the great British, French, and Dutch empires had virtually ceased to exist in Asia.
After independence many countries in Asia sought to develop industries of their own to produce substitutes for their former imports. This happened under both socialist and nonsocialist regimes. A few countries—Japan the most notable among them—lacking natural resources but endowed with an educated labour force, opted for promoting new industrial production for export instead of import substitution. In general this strategy has paid off better, particularly for Japan and the “four tigers”—Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. At the beginning of the 21st century nearly all countries were responding to the globalization of production by promoting exports and opening domestic markets to international competition to varying degrees. Such liberalization exposed those economies to the volatility of international markets, and there were major currency collapses and episodes of capital flight in the late 1990s. Although most Asian economies had begun to recover by 2000, there was still a legacy of unemployment, poverty, and resentment for many.
Southwest Asia (the Middle East) is the cradle of three great monotheistic systems: Judaism and its offshoots Christianity and Islam. Judaism, founded in the eastern Mediterranean region some 4,000 years ago, posits a covenant relationship between God—the source of divine law—and humankind. Most Asian Jews now live in Israel, although there are small Jewish communities in various other areas of the continent. In the 20th century a number of Jewish sects and reform movements founded elsewhere accompanied immigrants to Israel.
Christianity, which was derived from Judaism some two millennia ago, came to have the largest number of believers among the world’s religions. After it was adopted by the Roman and Byzantine empires, Christianity became predominant in Europe and in European-derived cultures. It is practiced by sizable minorities in many Asian countries (notably South Korea) and by Roman Catholic majorities in East Timor and the Philippines.
Islam dominates as the state religion of most Southwest Asian countries, and a substantial majority of Muslims live in Asia. From the Arabian Peninsula, where it was founded in the 7th century, Islam spread throughout the Middle East, into Central Asia and parts of South Asia, and across the Bay of Bengal to Malaysia and to Indonesia, which remains predominantly Muslim. The majority of Asian Muslims belong to the orthodox Sunni branch, except in Iran and Iraq, where members of the more esoteric Shiʿi branch are in the majority. Muslims constitute important minority populations in India, the Philippines, and China. Among the other religions that developed in Southwest Asia are Zoroastrianism, an ancient religion that survives in Iran and India and contains both monotheistic and dualistic elements and Bahāʾī, a universalist faith founded in Persia (Iran) in the mid-19th century.
5 Historic Moments That Transformed Asia In The Last Century
In the hundred years of its publication, FORBES has witnessed an incredible gamut of history. From the U.S. joining WWI in 1917 to the surprise election of Donald Trump last year, there has been no shortage of momentous events, and FORBES has documented it all with its signature line of storytelling and analysis.
Asia exists as its very own narrative within this century-long tale. The rise of Asia as an economic power has been one of the most riveting and central stories of the twentieth century, from Japan’s post-war economic miracle to China’s surprise emergence as a superpower.
Today, Asia holds 60% of the world’s population, and is the fastest growing economic region in the world. But that progress wouldn't come overnight. Here are some of the most defining and consequential moments of Asia's last century.
Paris Peace Conference (1919)
Signaling the end of the First World War, the Paris Peace Conference – and its famous Treaty of Versailles – didn’t sit so peacefully with every nation who attended.
“The result of this conference eventually led China and Vietnam to become socialist nations, and Japan to WWII,” says Dr. Xu Guoqi, a professor of history at University of Hong Kong and a leading authority on China's modern history.
“Both Chinese and Vietnamese were excited about the new world order proposed by American president Woodrow Wilson, especially his ideas about national self-determination and new diplomacy,” says Dr. Xu. “The future Vietnamese leader Ho Chi-minh personally showed up at the Paris Peace Conference and even made to the conference a moderate proposal for Vietnam's autonomy. But the world powers refused to consider his proposal, and the deeply disappointed Ho soon went to Moscow and eventually turned Vietnam as a socialist nation.”
American troops in Paris during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. (Source: AP)
China was equally left out of the negotiating process over the issue of the foreign concession of Shandong province.
“In Asia, Japan consolidated its position as a major regional power at the expense of China, where disappointment and frustration led to a huge demonstration in Beijing against foreign intervention on 4 May 1919,” writes historian Alan Sharp, referring to the May Fourth Movement which was a precursor to the birth of Chinese communism that Mao Zedong himself would reference.
Japanese Surrender (1945)
"Japan had been the geo-political tiger of Asia from the time it was 'opened' in the nineteenth century until its defeat in 1945," says Dan Carlin, host of the popular history podcasts "Hardcore History" and "Common Sense."
Indeed, Japan's fall from grace would usher in a new era of regional dominance for other international players -- most notably, the Americans.
“The U.S. moved in and began nation building in the region,” says Daniel Rechtschaffen, a FORBES contributor on Chinese affairs. This, he argues, was a “pre-cursor to the modern-day East Asia geopolitical makeup.”
“This ended three and a half decades of occupation of Korean peninsula, opening a political vacuum seized by Kim Jong-il -- who consequently founded North Korea, a catalyst in the ensuing Korean War 1950-1953,” says Rechtschaffen.
Of course, the implications of that war would echo on for decades – with potentially catastrophic consequences today.
“When the [Korean] war was over, no peace treaty was signed among the related parties -- still not yet today,” says Dr. Xu. “This background of the Korean War and the resulting armistice have led us to today's dilemma in Korea.”
Partition of the Indian Subcontinent (1947)
“What should have been a triumphant outcome to a decades-long independence struggle instead culminated into tragedy with the horrors of partition,” says Ronak Desai, a scholar of Harvard’s India & South Asia Program and FORBES contributor on Indian politics.
After the Second World War, Great Britain lacked the resources needed to control one of its longest held colonies, India. The British pulled out in 1947, and almost immediately the country split along one of the region’s most polarizing characteristics: religion.
Historian William Dalrymple writes that “there began one of the greatest migrations in human history, as millions of Muslims trekked to West and East Pakistan (the latter now known as Bangladesh) while millions of Hindus and Sikhs headed in the opposite direction. Many hundreds of thousands never made it.”
The result of this vivisection resulted in the South Asian landscape as we know it today – with India and Pakistan traversing very different paths throughout the decades.
“One became the largest functioning democracy in the world, secular and pluralistic in nature with a respect for the rule of law the other hijacked by extremism, religious intolerance, military dictatorship and violence which have sadly become key features of the state,” says Desai.
“More than 70 years later, the traumatic shadow of partition continues to loom large over the 1.5 billion individuals living in the subcontinent.”
Collapse of the Soviet Union (1991)
Despite being on the same ideological side during the Cold War, China and the Soviet Union were anything but allies.
“China and the United States were brought together in part because both were concerned about the threat to China and the rest of Asia from an aggressive Soviet Union,” wrote U.S. President Richard Nixon of his Cold War-era presidency in his 1994 autobiography, Beyond Peace.
Chairman Mao Zedong (L) welcomes US President Richard Nixon, at his house in Beijing. President . [+] Nixon urged China to join the United States in a 'long march together' on different roads to world peace. (AFP/Getty Images)
But with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, brought on by reforms introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev, that common interest was lost -- which lead to a cooling of U.S.-China relations that many experts believe has carried over until today.
Perhaps most importantly, argues contributor Dan Rechtschaffen, was the damage to the communist state itself.
"Most importantly, I think the collapse of the USSR showed the failure of the communist experiment that had spread across most of Asia during the twentieth century," he says. "It was the final indication that countries had to adopt capitalist systems to survive in a global environment."
China and India Open Up (1978, 1991)
These might be two separate events in Asia's history but the implications for the region are among the most far-reaching and impactful the world has seen.
Following the death of Chairman Mao Zedong in 1976, a new type of leader emerged in China who would usher in new policies that embraced the market economy. "Deng Xiaoping launched economic reforms beginning December 1978, reversing decades of Maoist economic policies," says Rechtschaffen. "China developed into a powerhouse in the following decades, upsetting global markets and increasingly becoming a regional hegemon. [This] sets the stage for a 21st century overtake of the U.S. economy predicted to happen by mid-century."
(JOHANNES EISELE/AFP/Getty Images)
Not to be overshadowed, India's later economic reforms would also be heavily influential.
"India's economy prior to 1991 (prior to Singh's reforms) was heavily influenced by and modeled after the Soviet Union's own system of centralized planning," says Ronak Desai. "The majority of India's population during this time survived on less than a dollar a day. India's economy came to be known as the infamous License Raj."
Reforms to the system designed by then-Finance Minister Manmohan Singh sought to transform the status quo by building cash reserves, dismantling a stifling bureaucracy, and opening the economy up to foreign investment. The measures worked, with hundreds of millions lifted out of poverty. India's economy is today one of the largest in the world, with some forecasting it to take China's place as the top driver of global growth.
"India's growth story has become a model of for other countries to emulate, says Desai. "Three years into his tenure as prime minister, the challenge facing Modi is whether he continues what his predecessor began more than 25 years ago by implementing the structural reforms necessary to keep India's economy growing in a way that is both sustainable and inclusive."
What are your picks for the most important moments to shape modern Asia? Leave your thoughts in the comments section.
Central Asia: A Historical Overview
Very little information has appeared about the region of Central Asia in books and articles. There are two reasons for this problem. First of all, there is really no country that one can identify in the area until early 1990s. Most specialists in Asian studies tend to focus on a specific country. But for Central Asia, this is not the case. In addition, this area was closed off to the foreigners until recently because the western part of Central Asia was under Soviet rule and the eastern part was part of China.
There are five Central Asian countries that used to part of the Soviet Union. Four of them are Turkic (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan), and one is Persian speaking (Tajikistan). On the eastern side of Central Asia is the autonomous region of Xinjiang. Some people will also include Afghanistan as part of Central Asia. Very often, this area is also referred to as Inner Asia. This term, however, incorporates a broader sweep that includes Mongolia, Manchuria, and parts of Iran. It is an area that has witnessed tremendous amount of historical incidences. It is about the most multi-cultural region that you can imagine. Every major religion has passed through this area, such as Buddhism, Islam, Zoroastrianism, etc. Every artistic media, like sculptures, ceramics, cave paintings, has also flourished in this region.
Although there are tremendous interests in this area, Central Asia has not attracted much attention. This is partially due to the fact that the people in this area are transmitters rather than creators. Their roles have been to transmit ideas and innovations across Asia. The second drawback is that there was not a written language early on in history. The first written language was Sogdian that dated to 6th-7th centuries C.E., almost 2,000 years later than the Chinese language. The first Turkic script was derived from the 8th-9th centuries C.E. For the most part, our knowledge of the area prior to this period was derived from the material remains rather the literary sources. In addition, the population of this area did not develop a historical consciousness, like China or Persia. Very often, we have to depend on the Chinese or Persian accounts to tell us about this region that distort the whole history. In many instances, a negative image of Central Asia was conveyed.
The first important innovation of this region was the development of wheel in today Kazakhstan. The first chariot was also developed in this region around 2000-1500 B.C.E.
We don’t know much about the people who lived in this region until the appearance of the Scythians in 8th-7th centuries B.C.E. The Scythians started out in Central Asia and swept all the way across to the Black Sea region. They were an important force from 8th-4th centuries B.C.E. They exhibited a lot of nomadic characteristics of Central Asia.
The Scythians were divided into two groups, the royal and the ordinary. From burials, we have learnt that the royal group tends to be taller physically. Height tends to play a role in history. It appears that the Scythians did have kings, but most of them met a grisly end. They did not seem to have a system of succession. Eventually a system of tanistry was installed in which nobles and princes will get together and choose the successor. This system, however, did not work very well. So there was always an extraordinary amount of instability within these Central Asian kingdoms or khanates.
Most of the Central Asian people are nomadic. The optimal size of a nomadic unit is usually small because the land cannot sustain a group of animals that is too large in number. Too many animals would require the group to move constantly to look for new pasture for the animals. The best unit is a tribal unit, which is a small group. In this case, the unit does not have to travel as much since the animals are not consuming the grass as rapidly. It is difficult to go beyond this tribal system of organization. The Scythians followed these patterns.
The Scythians also depended on their horses. The horses gave them mobility in warfare and made them an effective military force. The sedentary people whom they came in to contact with did not have this mobility.
Women played a very important role in the nomadic group. The economic structure of the nomadic organization cannot be sustained without them. Women carry out all the chores and labor. These so-called “barbarians” by the Chinese are far advanced in terms of women’s rights. We know in later periods of nomadic history that women have to right to own property and animals, which is unique in traditional times. They have a right to divorce. While the men can focus on warfare and fighting against enemies, the women would take care of economic basis of the entire economy of a nomadic group.
The nomads love arts and crafts. In the case of the Scythians, it was the gold as seen in the spectacular animal-style objects.
All these people supported trade. They need objects and products that they cannot produce themselves. Access to sedentary civilizations is important to their survival. Unlike the Chinese, the nomads are very supportive of commerce and value trade enormously.
Another characteristic that afflicts these people throughout the ages is the horrendous problems with alcohol. Initially, it was fermented mare milk. But as these people interact with sedentary folks, they have an even greater access to liquor. One of my friends has pointed out that one of the reasons of the Mongols’ decline had to do with liquor and food. Increased access to alcohol and much richer food led to shorter lifespan. In some ways, Islam has helped the situation in this region because of the prohibition of liquor.
The Scythians began to decline around 5th century B.C.E. and eventually were overwhelmed by another nomadic group. This is very typical. Nomadic empires last for relative short periods. One possible explanation is that splits among the nomads appear once they become successful. Some of them began to live in cities in order to rule, and they began to lose their heritage and values that are associated with nomads. As they are gradually assimilated into a sedentary way of life, they find themselves at odds with the people who continue to be nomads. For example, the Mongol empire collapsed because of internal rifts and civil wars rather than external factors.
The next great Central Asian empire was the Xiongnu, who may have been the ancestors of the Huns. They arrived around the 3rd century B.C.E. and began to challenge the Chinese. There were disputes about trade and land. The Han dynasty, which ruled China from 3rd century B.C.E. to 3rd century C.E. (206 B.C.E. – 220 C.E.), tried to deal with the nomads in a variety of ways. None of them was particular successful. One way to deflect raids and attacks is to work out marital alliances. Often, a Chinese princess would be sent to the head of Xiongnu confederation in marriage. This, however, did not solve the economic problem since the Xiongnu wanted to trade with China. Eventually, the Chinese devised a tribute system that worked rather well. This system is really a trade system but it portrayed the Xiongnu as inferiors. If the Xiongnu accept three requirements -- accepting the Chinese calendar as their calendar, paying respect to a newly enthroned emperor, and sending periodic tribute to the Chinese court, they are allowed to set up tribute embassies which were really trade missions. This resolved the conflicts between the Central Asian nomads and the Chinese for quite some time.
The Xiongnu was overwhelmed by the Ugyhurs around the 8th century. The Uyghurs are the first important Turkic group. They played a dramatic role in linking the West and the East. The Uyghur people were also the first to have a developed written language that was based upon Aramaic. The Uyghur also adopted the Manichaeism and they introduced this religion to China as well. The Uyghurs traded across Eurasia they brought different objects into China, such as Persian silvers and textiles. They introduced Islam into China. Vise versa, they also helped bringing Chinese culture to the west. In short, they acted as cultural transmitters. Around 840, the Uyghur Empire collapsed due to divisions between the nomadic and sedentary groups.
Period of Decline
Meanwhile in Central Asia, Islam was developing at a rapid rate partly through the efforts of Arab and Persian traders who crossed along the Silk Road. They converted the local people. Mosques were built in cities like Samarkand and Bukhara.
In late 9th and early 10th century, China collapsed. Simultaneously, the opposite empire in Persia also went into a period of decline. Thus, from 10th to 13th century, Central Asia could no longer function as transmitter, the role that it traditionally played.
The Mongols revived this situation when they came into power in the 13th century. They created a condition that allowed extraordinary contact to be made between the East and the West. The Mongols had taken all the characteristics of Central Asian nomads and elevated them to the highest degree. They were very interested in trade. Europeans arrived in China for the first time through the Mongols. They imported Persian medicine into China and had a great impact on Chinese medicine. Persian astronomical instruments were also brought to Beijing. A new and more accurate calendar was created as a result. They also built observatories in China, which was a Mongol innovation. Mongols also had an impact on Chinese textile in the 13th century The Mongol empire later collapsed due to internal rifts.
The Roles of China and Russia in the post-Mongol Period
Once the Mongols were out of the picture, the role of Central Asia changed. This has a lot to do with the after-effects of the Mongol rule. In the east, the Chinese became increasingly xenophobic. As a result, China was more and more isolated. In Persia, there was also an aversion towards foreign influences. Central Asia could no longer play the role of a transmitter of culture and technology. The Silk Road also began to decline during this period. When trade diminished, the Central Asian people also became impoverished.
In the early 16th century, Iran was converted to the Shiite form of Islam. This put them at odds with the Muslims in the west as well as the east. This development also had a negative impact on trade. Between the 16th and 18th centuries, this area became the backwater. This region has lost its significance. The discovery of sea routes is an additional strike against Central Asia. The population by this time decreased in this area. This region became culturally stagnant.
Starting around the 17th century, both Russia and China made incursions into Central Asia. The Russians initially wanted to build up a buffer zone from the east by expanding into this region. China did the same kind of thing from the east. The Russians eventually were also interested in trading with China. They are interested in tea, silk, porcelain, etc. These commodities could fetch tremendous prices in Europe. They, in the end, signed a treaty with the Chinese in 1689. This treaty allowed the Russians to enter China to trade for these products. In return, the Chinese got additional territory in Central and Inner Asia. Simultaneously, the Russians demanded the Chinese to accept a number of Russian students to study the Chinese and Manchu languages. As a result, Orthodox mission was also set up in China in the 18th century The Russians were the only foreign country to have a presence in China during this time. However, this kind of exchange was not very popular on either side.
Russians also began to take over gradually Central Asia during this period. By the 19th century, Central Asia was completely taken over by Russia. In 1868, the Russians moved into Tashkent and made the city their capital in Central Asia. China moved into the region of Xinjiang even earlier in 1760s. The results in both cases were disastrous. The Tsarist and Chinese governments tried to prevent problems by instructing their: 1) not to interfere with the practice of Islam, 2) not to impose discriminatory taxation on the local population, and 3) not to let Chinese and Russian nationals to take advantage of the local people.
Unfortunately, the group of officials who were sent out to Central Asia did not observe these instructions. The results were riots and revolts. Considerable local oppositions against foreign powers existed in Russian Central Asia in 19th century, such as the revolts by the Kazakhs in 1840s and the revolts among the oases of Central Asia in 1860s. These rebellions continued into the 20th century. It was not until 1928 that these rebellions were completely quelled. Similar situation also applied to the region of Xinjiang (Chinese Central Asia or Tarim Basin).
The Great Game and its Effect on Local Islamic Population in Central Asia
Meanwhile, the British were trying to build a buffer zone to protect India, particularly from Russia, by expanding into areas such as Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. In addition, they also tried to expand into Tibet and Afghanistan. These activities were later referred to as the Great Game.
As a result, the Islamic population in Central Asia was being surrounded by Great Britain, Russia, and China in the 19th century. These foreign powers attacked Islam as a religion, the infrastructure that existed in these oases, and the nomadic way of life.
The situation in Central Asia during the 20th & 21st centuries is very much related to the events that took place in the 18th & 19th centuries.
Meanwhile, the British were trying to build a buffer zone to protect India, particularly from Russia, by expanding into areas such as Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. In addition, they also tried to expand into Tibet and Afghanistan. These activities were later referred to as the Great Game.
As a result, the Islamic population in Central Asia was being surrounded by Great Britain, Russia, and China in the 19th century. These foreign powers attacked Islam as a religion, the infrastructure that existed in these oases, and the nomadic way of life.
The situation in Central Asia during the 20th & 21st centuries is very much related to the events that took place in the 18th & 19th centuries.
The Evolution of Colonial Cultures: Nineteenth-Century Asia
This chapter explores the phenomenon of ‘invisible empire’, that is, the many different encounters of the intellect and imagination which brought Asians and Britons together, often violently and contentiously, during the ‘long’ nineteenth century. It specifically asks what cultural differences British rule made to the complex societies of colonial Asia. It also concentrates on three main aspects of ‘invisible empire’. The first of these is setting and context, that is, the basic facts of urbanization, literacy, and other forces shaping local cultural encounters. The second is religion, since it was in the arena of worship that the peoples of East and West had many of their most far-reaching confrontations. The third is the intersection of culture and politics, with the political defined to include public debates on the status of women as well as other ‘modern’ issues touching on the definition of collective and individual rights and moral standards.
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CENTRAL ASIA vii. In the 18th-19th Centuries
I. From the fall of the Toqay-Timurids through the Russian conquest.
By the beginning of the 12th/18th century Central Asia was in a state of a deepening political and economic crisis, which manifested itself in the decline of the ruling dynasties and central government in both the Uzbek khanates of Central Asia (Bukhara and Ḵᵛārazm), in the resurgence of tribal forces, disruption of economic life, and increasing interference of the steppe nomads into the affairs of the sedentary states (Kazakhs in Bukhara and Turkmen in Ḵᵛārazm). The tribal leaders were acquiring greater power and auton­omy from the central government, while the latter, not having its own military force (other than small khans&rsquo bodyguards, mainly Kalmak, Russian, and Persian slaves), could only maneuver between the powerful chieftains, aligning with some of them against the others. But such alliances were not stable, and a general political instability resulted. It was aggravated by a decrease of state revenues as a result of a decline of international caravan trade through Central Asia, the spread of tax exemptions to big landlords, and the declining authority of the central government in the provinces. In Bukhara, this negative development must have taken place already under Sobḥānqolī Khan, to judge from the fact that it was quite evident at the very beginning of the reign of his son and successor ʿObayd-­Allāh Khan (1114-23/1702-11). This ruler tried to reverse the process and to limit the power of tribal chief­tains, probably with the support of urban population, but his miscalculated financial policy (see bukhara iii, p. 518) triggered a rebellion in Bukhara in 1120/1708, which ended in a compromise between the government and the rebels and alienated those very sections of the population that could have given him support. ʿObayd-­Allāh Khan became the victim of a conspiracy of Uzbek amirs and was assassinated in 1123/1711, and under his successor, Abu&rsquol-Fayż Khan (1123-60/1711-47), the central government lost all its authority, and the country practically disintegrated into a number of tribal principalities. Balḵ finally separated from the khanate and was ruled by Uzbek chieftains, who, however, invited puppet khans from among the descendants of Walī-­Moḥammad Khan from Khorasan (see Akhmedov, pp. 230-31), while the Farḡāna (Fergana) valley had been independent since the end of the 11th/17th century (see below). Wars between various rival tribal group­ings affected most of all the central part of the khanate. In 1135/1722 Ebrāhīm Bī (Biy), chieftain of the Keneges tribe, together with several other tribal leaders, started rebellion in Samarkand, where they enthroned Rajab Sultan, a cousin of the khan of Ḵīva, &Scaronīr Ḡāzī (ʿAbd-al-­Raḥmān Ṭāleʿ, pp. 68-69 Abduraimov, pp. 169-174). Rajab Sultan sought help from the Kazakhs, who then ravaged the central regions of Transoxiana for seven years, destroying fields and orchards and pillaging cities and villages (Moḥammad-Wafā Karmīnagī, fols. 19b-21b). Urban and rural population began to flee from the areas most seriously affected by these disturbances, so that, according to a Bukharan historian of the 13th/19th century, Samarkand was entirely abandoned, and in Bukhara only two city quarters (goḏar) re­mained inhabited (cf. Bregel, 1989, p. 518). On the other hand, the flight of population from the central regions contributed to the development of peripheral areas, especially to the growth of cities in the southeastern part of the khanate and in Farḡāna. By 1142/1730 the Kazakhs had left Transoxiana, but the central govern­ment was unable to reassert itself, and in the 1140s/1730s its authority remained limited to some of the districts closest to the city of Bukhara (see Vel&rsquoyaminov-Zernov, 1855, Appendix, p. 22). In Bukhara itself power was gradually concentrated in the hands of the khan&rsquos atalïq (ātālīq), Moḥammad-Ḥakīm Bī Manḡīt.
At the same time, political and economic decline made itself felt in the khanate of Ḵīva as well. The rule of the ʿArab&scaronāhī dynasty (pp. 244-45) came to an end between 1106/1694 and 1140/1727, and, although total political disintegration similar to that in Bukhara did not follow immediately, the northern, predominantly nomadic, half of the country, known as Aral, seceded and during more than a century remained most of the time not only independent from, but also at war with Ḵīva. From the end of the ʿArab&scaronāhī rule there was a marked increase of the Turkmen presence in Ḵᵛārazm, and the Turkmen tribes of Sālor, Čowdūr and Yomūt took part in the feuds between different Uzbek factions. This increasing role of Turkmen in Ḵᵛārazm coincided with the expansion of Turkmen tribes into northern Khorasan after the fall of the Safavids. The khans of Ḵīva &Scaronīr Ḡāzī (1126-39/1714-27) and Īlbārs (1140-52/1728-39) also used this opportunity to repeatedly raid Khorasan. Nāder Shah was at first unable to retaliate, being engaged in wars elsewhere, but in 1150/1737 Reżāqolī Mīrzā, son of Nāder Shah, captured Balḵ, crossed the Amu Darya, and launched an attack on Bukhara, not Ḵīva. He defeated the army of Abu&rsquol-Fayż Khan and besieged him in Qar&scaronī (Karshi), but had to return to Balḵ either (according to the Central Asian historians) because of the news of the arrival of Īlbārs Khan with a large army to help the Bukharans or (according to Mīrzā Mahdī Khan Astarābādī and Moḥammad-Kāẓem) because he was just recalled by Nāder Shah (see Moḥammad-Wafā Karmīnagī, fol. 36a Moʾnes and Āgahī, p. 164 Mīrzā Mahdī Khan, Tārīḵ, p. 111 idem, Dorra, p. 402 Moḥammad-Kāẓem, II, p. 603). A major cam­paign against both Uzbek khanates followed in 1153/1740. After Nāder Shah crossed the Amu Darya near Čārjūy, Moḥammad-Ḥakīm Atalïq and a number of other Uzbek chieftains came to his camp and offered their submission Nāder Shah marched on Bukhara, set up his camp in a suburb of the city, and received there the submission of Abu&rsquol-Fayż Khan himself. The city of Bukhara was spared Persian occupation, but the khanate had to provide 200 thousand ḵarvār of grain and fodder to the Persian army it also had to supply 10,000 horsemen, under the command of Mo­ḥammad-Raḥīm, son of Moḥammad-Ḥakīm Atalïq (see Moḥammad-Wafā Karmīnagī, fols. 49a-50a Mo­ḥammad-Kāẓem, Moscow, II, pp. 525-42 ed. Rīāhī, II, pp. 786ff.). Nāder Shah next turned to Ḵᵛārazm. He defeated the army of Ḵīva in two battles and besieged the khan in the city of Ḵānqāh. After a seven days&rsquo siege, Īlbārs Khan surrendered and, by order of Nāder Shah, was put to death together with twenty of his amirs, and several days later Ḵīva also surrendered. Nāder Shah set free all slaves in Ḵīva (Persians, Russians, Kalmaks), of whom he made 12,000 Khora­sanis return to Khorasan, where they were settled in a newly built town named Ḵīvaqābād (Ḵīvaābād), 4 farsaḵs from Abīvard. The Khanate of Ḵīva had to provide the Persian army with 1,000 ḵarvār of grain and 4,000 horsemen. Nāder Shah left Ḵᵛārazm after installing a certain Ṭāher, a relative of the Bukharan Janids, as khan. (On Nāder Shah&rsquos Khivan campaign see: Mīrzā Mahdī Khan, Tārīḵ, pp. 132-35 Moʾnes and Āgahī, pp. 165-67 Moḥammad-Kāẓem, Moscow, II, pp. 548-72, 581-82, ed. Rīāḥī, II, pp. 802-21, 825-28. See also Mīr ʿAbd-al-Karīm Boḵārī, text, pp. 48-49, tr., pp. 104-06 ʿAbd-al-Karīm explains the execution of Īlbārs Khan as revenge for the killing of three ambassadors sent to the khan by Nāder Shah.)
Nāder Shah&rsquos domination in Central Asia remained largely nominal, and he did not interfere in the internal affairs of the two khanates, except for suppressing a Turkmen rebellion in Ḵᵛārazm in 1158/1745 (according to Moḥammad-Kāẓem, Moscow, III, pp. 170-73, ed. Rīāḥī, II, pp. 825-28, the resettlement of Persian slaves to Ḵīvaqābād took place after this campaign). When Ṭāher Khan was killed in Ḵīva as a result of a popular uprising and the Qezelbā&scaron garrison in Ḵīva was mas­sacred in 1155/1742, Nāder Shah was satisfied with the assurances of allegiance by the Uzbek nobility of Ḵᵛārazm and an additional 5,000 Uzbek soldiers and entrusted the reign to a son of Īlbārs Khan (Mīrzā Mahdī Khan, Tārīḵ, p. 141 Moʾnes and Āgahī, pp. 167-­68). Both khanates were actually ruled by the chieftains of the Manḡīt tribe, who enjoyed Nāder Shah&rsquos support, but it was only in Bukhara that the Manḡīts stayed in power also after the shah&rsquos death.
In Bukhara, the death of Moḥammad-Ḥakīm Atalïq in 1156/1743 was followed by a new wave of tribal feuds, during which the city of Bukhara itself was sacked by rebellious Uzbek tribes (1158/1745). To help restore order Nāder Shah dispatched Moḥammad-Raḥīm Bī, son of Moḥammad-Ḥakīm, with Qezelbā&scaron and Ḡelzī troops to Bukhara, and Abu&rsquol-Fayż Khan was deposed. According to Moḥammad-Kāẓem (Moscow, III, pp. 399-400, ed. Rīāḥī, III, p. 1120) a twelve-year-old son of Abu&rsquol-Fayż, ʿAbd-al-Moʾmen, was proclaimed khan, but the earliest known coins of ʿAbd-al-Moʾmen are dated 1160/1747 (see Vel&rsquoyaminov-Zernov, 1858, p. 408 Davidovich, p. 239). In any event, Moḥammad-Raḥīm apparently became atalïq (thus according to Moḥammad-Kāẓem, loc. cit.) and actual ruler (cf. ʿAbd-­al-Karīm Boḵārī, text, p. 51, tr., p. 111, according to whom the deposition of Abu&rsquol-Fayż took place only after the death of Nāder Shah). With the help of his Qezelbā&scaron and Ḡelzī supporters, Moḥammad-Raḥīm Atalïq was able to defeat the rebel Uzbek tribes of Mīānkal (the central part of the Zaraf&scaronān valley) and consolidated his rule in Bukhara by appointing his men to key positions in the administration. After the assas­sination of Nāder Shah (1160/1747), Moḥammad-Raḥīm Atalïq had Abu&rsquol-Fayż Khan killed, probably in the same year, to judge from the date of the coins of Abu&rsquol-Fayż&rsquos son and successor (see above). ʿAbd-al-Moʾmen was also killed by order of Moḥammad-Raḥīm Atalïq, but the exact date is not clear (apparently between 1163/1750 and 1164/1751, see ʿAbd-al-Karīm Boḵārī, text, p. 52, tr., p. 115 Vel&rsquoyaminov-Zernov, 1855, II, Appendix, p. 16 idem, 1858, pp. 411-12). According to some sources, ʿAbd-al-Moʾmen was succeeded by another nominal khan, named ʿObayd-Allāh, who did not belong to the Janid dynasty, but in 1167/1753 Moḥammad-Raḥīm Atalïq himself was proclaimed khan (Vel&rsquoyaminov-Zernov, &ldquoMonety,&rdquo pp. 411-412) according to other sources, the enthronement of Moḥammad-Raḥīm Khan occurred in 1160/1756 (Bartol&rsquod, 1963, p. 279 the known coins of Moḥammad-­Raḥīm Khan do not have dates). The assumption of the title of khan by a non-Chingizid&mdashcontrary to the steppe tradition, which until then had been adhered to by the Uzbeks&mdashhad been &ldquolegitimized&rdquo by the earlier marriage of Moḥammad-Raḥīm to a daughter of Abu&rsquol-Fayż Khan.
During all of his reign, Moḥammad-Raḥīm Khan had to fight rebellious Uzbek tribes, whom he finally managed to pacify, but only after destroying several tribal fortresses and resettling the most troublesome groups. He reconquered &Scaronahr-e Sabz, Ḥeṣār, and Kolāb and annexed such outlying areas as Ḵojand, Tashkent, and Turkestan. He lost, however, the regions south of the Amu Darya to Aḥmad Shah Dorrānī. When Moḥammad-Raḥīm Khan died in 1172/1758, his grandson from a daughter, Fāżel Töre, was en­throned, while Moḥammad-Raḥīm&rsquos uncle, Dānīāl Bī, was made his atalïq, but when several Uzbek tribes and provincial rulers rebelled, Dānīāl Bī deposed Fāżel Töre and put Abu&rsquol-Ḡāzī, a Janid prince, on the throne as a puppet figure, while he himself was actual ruler. Under Dānīāl Bī the Manḡīt administration became stable, and his son and successor, &Scaronāh-Morād (1200-15/1785-1801), deposed Abu&rsquol-Ḡāzī and ascen­ded the throne himself. He and the subsequent rulers of the Manḡīt dynasty used amir as their main title (see bukhara iii).
In the khanate of Ḵīva the period of turmoil lasted longer than in Bukhara. The Manḡīt chieftains sup­ported by Nāder Shah were able to stay in power only for four years after Nāder&rsquos death, and in 1165/1752 they were eliminated by Ḡāyeb Khan, a Kazakh Chingizid (Moʾnes and Āgahī, p. 171 in the Year of the Hen, i.e., 1153/1753). Ḡāyeb Khan attempted to gather more authority in his own hands but had to flee to the steppe when the Uzbeks again rebelled and his second successor, Tīmūr Ḡāzī Khan, was assassinated in 1177/1764 (Moʾnes and Āgahī, pp. 174-75). All the power in the country was now in the hands of Uzbek amirs, who used to invite khans from the steppe and depose them at will (a practice described by ʿAbd-al-­Karīm Boḵārī as ḵān-bāzī, text, p. 79, tr., p. 180). There were also fierce clashes between different Uzbek and Turkmen tribes, in which the chieftains of the Qongrats (Qonqrāt), apparently the largest Uzbek tribe in Ḵᵛā­razm and traditional enemies of the Manḡīts, gradually gained the upper hand, but not before the (Turkmen) Yomuts had captured Ḵīva in 1184/1770 (Moʾnes and Āgahī, p. 240), plunging the country into the state of total anarchy. Moḥammad-Amīn Inaq (Īnāq), the leader of the Qongrats, defeated and banished the Yomuts later the same year, but he continued to enthrone puppet khans from the Kazakh Chingizids, and during his entire rule as inaq (to 1204/1790, see Moʾnes and Āgahī, p. 308) he had to fight numerous rivals from other tribes. Under his son, ʿAważ Inaq (1204-18/1790-1804), the position of the inaq of Ḵīva was strengthened, and ʿAważ Inaq&rsquos son and successor, Eltüzer Inaq, felt strong enough to depose the Chingizid puppet khan and have himself proclaimed khan (1219/1804 see Moʾnes and Āgahī, p. 425), founding the new dynasty of the Qongrats.
In the 12th/18th century a third Uzbek khanate emerged in the Farḡāna region. From the end of the 11th/17th century most of this region had been under the authority of the Naq&scaronbandī shaikhs (khojas, ḵᵛājas) of the village of Čādak in the northern part of the valley, while the area of Ḵojand at its western end was dominated by the Uzbek tribe of Yüz. The leaders of another Uzbek tribe, the Ming, in the western part of the Farḡāna valley east of Ḵojand, gradually gathered strength and extended their influence to the entire valley. &Scaronāhroḵ Bī Ming eliminated the khojas of Čādak in 1121/1709-10 (Nīāz-Moḥammad, p. 21). Another Ming ruler, ʿAbd-al-Karīm Bī, founded the city of Ḵoqand (Ḵūqand) in the western part of Farḡāna in 1153/1740 (ibid., pp. 28-30), which became the capital of the Mings. During the rule of Nārbūta Bī (ca. 1183-1213/1770-98) Farḡāna was finally united under the Mings and enjoyed relative stability, which contributed to an influx of population from other areas, especially Transoxiana and Kā&scaronḡar. Nārbūta&rsquos son and successor, ʿĀlem (1213-25/1798-1810), was the first Ming ruler to assume the title of khan and can be considered the founder of the dynasty. A genealogical legend, tracing the origin of the Ming rulers back to Bābor and thus relating them to Chingizids, provided the legitimization of the dynasty for the Uzbeks.
Thus, by the end of the 18th century three new Uzbek dynasties emerged in Central Asia, two in the previously existing states, Bukhara and Ḵᵛārazm, and one that founded a new khanate, that of Ḵoqand. However, these events did not simply belong to dynastic history but were indicative of some more important processes. The earlier political and economic decline of Central Asia (see above) can be attributed primarily to the decline of the international caravan trade in Asia and the growing isolation of Central Asia from the main routes of commercial and cultural exchange, parallel to the degradation of the Chingizid dynasties, the increasing role of nomads in the political life, and the growing independence of tribal chieftains, all of which combined to produce political anarchy. By contrast, the new economic and political revival may be attrib­uted to the growth of trade with Russia, which became especially rapid by the end of the century and helped the recovery of the old cities and the development of new urban centers and must have made more prominent the social and political role of the urban population, which by its very nature needs political stability. At the same time, there was a growing tendency toward sedentarization among the nomadic population, es­pecially the Uzbeks, and a part of their nobility, which had already acquired substantial landed property and wanted to develop it as their main source of income, was being drawn closer to the urban leadership. The greater political centralization in Central Asia that became evident by the end of the 12th/18th century can be attributed to these two convergent processes.
Such an explanation of the changes that took place is hypothetical, but in the case of Ḵᵛārazm, at least, it is confirmed by evidence showing close ties between the rising Qongrat dynasty and the notables of the Sarts, the local sedentary population (see Bregel, 1978). Similarly, some sources mention support given to Dānīāl Atalïq by the population of the city of Bukhara against the rebellious Uzbek tribes (see Chekhovich, 1956, p. 89).
In their centralizing efforts the three new Uzbek dynasties had to overcome the strong resistance of trib­al nobility. In this respect there was some similarity in the activity of the first energetic rulers of these states: Moḥammad-Raḥīm Khan, Dānīāl Atalïq, and &Scaronāh-­Morād in Bukhara Eltüzer Khan (1218-21/1804-06) and Moḥammad-Raḥīm Khan (1221-40/1806-25) in Ḵīva and ʿĀlem Khan and ʿOmar Khan (1225-38/1810-­22) in Ḵoqand. The founders of these dynasties had to fight numerous wars with their opponents from other tribes, killing many and bringing the rest to submission. In Ḵᵛārazm these wars ended with the conquest of the town of Qongrat and the final annexation of Aral in 1226/1811. In Bukhara the tribes had already been sub­dued by Moḥammad-Raḥīm Khan and Dānīāl Atalïq, but the final blow to the Uzbek tribal nobility came only under Amir Naṣr-Allāh (1242-77/1827-60), nick­named Amīr-e Qaṣṣāb (Amir the butcher) for his ruth­less extermination of all his opponents. For the same reason ʿĀlem Khan of Ḵoqand was nicknamed ʿĀlem-­Ẓālem (ʿĀlem the tyrant). In all three khanates the rulers organized military forces under the command of the khans&rsquo own appointees, separate from the tribal militia. These were standing troops, mostly infantry (sarbāz) equipped with firearms, including some rudi­mentary artillery in Ḵᵛārazm and Ḵoqand they appeared already at the beginning of the 13th/19th century, in Bukhara only in the 1240s-50s/1830s under Amir Naṣr-Allāh. They were recruited from the sedentary population, sometimes slaves or former slaves. Despite their small number and poor training they provided the central government with some leverage against the militarily declining Uzbek tribes. In addition, the khans of Ḵīva and Ḵoqand employed non-Uzbek troops, in Ḵīva Turkmen and in Ḵoqand Ḡāḷčas (i.e., Tajik mountaineers) and Afghan mercenaries.
The strengthening of the central government, how­ever, resulted in the establishment of despotic monar­chies. Bureaucracy increased, especially in Ḵᵛārazm and Ḵoqand (in Bukhara it was already fairly ramified), in which persons of low or, at least, non-Uzbek origin, such as former Persian slaves, Sarts, Turkmen (in Bukhara), and Tajiks (in Ḵoqand) but tied to the sov­ereign by personal loyalty often held key positions. There were, however, substantial differences between the administrative systems of the three khanates. The Khanate of Bukhara, by far the most populous and the richest of the three, was also the most autocratic, and the tribal nobility there retained very little of its former influence, although the Manḡīt aristocracy held a disproportionately great number of administrative positions. The provincial governors, though only appointed officials, exercised a great deal of autonomy the collecting of taxes was their job. In Ḵᵛārazm, which was smaller and had a centralized irrigation system, the administration of the state was more centralized very little authority was delegated to the provincial gover­nors, and taxes were collected by specially appointed officials from the central government once or twice a year. At the same time, the leaders of the Uzbek tribes, especially the Qongrat, the khan&rsquos own tribe, had some influence on the khan, who, in accordance with the old steppe custom would consult them on all important matters. The tribal population (Turkmen, Karakal­paks, Kazakhs, Uzbeks of Aral) was not under the jurisdiction of provincial governors but were ruled by their own autonomous chiefs. The administrative system of the Khanate of Ḵoqand was closer to that of Bukhara, with the khans as despotic as the amirs of Bukhara and much of the local authority delegated to provincial governors.
Ethnically all three khanates remained highly heterogeneous. Bukhara had the greatest percentage of Per­sian-speaking Tajiks, especially in Bukhara and Samarkand and in the eastern part of the country, the foothills and the mountain valleys of the western extensions of the Pamirs. In the countryside in the central part of the Transoxiana, Tajiks often lived intermingled with Uzbeks and Turkic-speaking groups who lived there before the advent of the Uzbeks some of them became Turcophone, although they would not call themselves Uzbek, a name that throughout the 13th/19th century was used only for the tribal population. A large portion of the sedentary people&mdashin the cities probably the majority&mdashwere bilingual and identified themselves more with their locality than with any particular ethnic group. In the Amu Darya valley, from Kerki to Čārjūy, there was a sizeable Turkman population, which in many places was also interspersed with Tajiks and Uzbeks, however. In Ḵᵛārazm ethnic divisions were more distinct. The old sedentary Iranian population, which had been finally Turkicized during the Mongol period, the Sarts, was concentrated mainly in the southern part of the country, both in the cities and countryside. The Uzbeks, although mixing freely with them, retained their tribal affiliation and separate identity, and the majority of them lived in the northern half of the country (the nomadic or seminomadic groups in the Aral). The Turkmen, who formed com­pact tribal groups along the southern and western fringes of the oasis of Ḵᵛārazm, made up almost 25 percent of its total population in the mid-13th/19th century, and the Karakalpaks, another compact group, occupied a large part of the Aral. Similar distinct ethnic divisions existed in the Khanate of Ḵoqand. There the sedentary population consisted of Sarts, tribal Uzbeks (Mings and others), and Tajiks (both the Tajiks of Farḡāna, who retained their Persian language, and the mountaineers, Kūhestānī or Ḡāḷča). The nomadic population, concentrated mainly in the central and northern parts of Farḡāna, consisted of Kipčaks and Kirghiz, but increased greatly after the annexation of the southern portions of the Da&scaront-e Qepčāq and the Kirghiz lands (see below). In all three khanates the tribal Uzbeks still had a somewhat higher social status, providing most men for the army and filling most positions at the court and in the central and provincial administration. However, their elite already had to share power with that of the Sarts and the Tajiks. Their monopoly on the military was also lost. In Ḵᵛārazm the Turkmen provided the best fighting force and, in exchange for their service, enjoyed a partially tax-­exempt status. In Ḵoqand Kipčaks and Kirghiz were at least as important militarily as the Uzbeks.
In the cultural field the Khanate of Bukhara is often considered as having been the most advanced, being the main heir to the great cultural achievements of Transoxiana in earlier periods, with the city of Bukhara still the center of Islamic religious life and learning in Central Asia. But after the Timurid period it had be­come a hotbed of extreme bigotry rather than a center of enlightenment. By contrast, Ḵīva and Ḵoqand, although inferior to Bukhara in various aspects of material life and much less important as religious centers, showed greater dynamism in certain spheres of secular culture. The most notable example is the vigorous literary activity in these khanates, especially the development of literature in Chaghatay, both original and translated from Persian. Of the three states the Khanate of Ḵīva was the most Turkic, with Chaghatay as the language of literature and chancery and Persian only known by the learned and probably still surviving among some Sarts as the second language. The culture of the Khanate of Ḵoqand was bilingual, though Tajik was used more than Turkic in literature and was almost the sole language used in the chancery. In the Khanate of Bukhara, Tajik was practically the only language of literature and chancery, and Trans­oxania was therefore looked upon as a Tajik country by the Uzbeks of Ḵᵛārazm, who used to refer even to the troops of Bukhara, somewhat contemptuously, as the Tajik army, although it contained mainly Uzbek soldiers. The linguistic picture reflected fairly well the relative importance of Turkic- and Tajik-speaking groups in the urban life of the khanates.
The trend towards centralization and unification in the political life of Central Asia in the 13th/19th century remained inconclusive. Parts of sedentary areas were not incorporated in either of three khanates. The principality of &Scaronahr-e Sabz, less than fifty miles south of Samarkand, was completely independent from Bukhara for at least three decades under the chiefs of the Uzbek tribe Keneges, traditional enemies of the Manḡīts, and the amir was able to subjugate it only in 1856, after numerous military campaigns. Farther east, the province of Ḥeṣār, whose ruler was a close relative of the amir, for most of the time remained semi­-independent. The principality of Ura-Tübe, between the khanates of Bukhara and Ḵoqand and dominated by the Uzbek tribe of Yüz, was a bone of contention and the cause of frequent wars between these khanates, though neither managed to annex it. The mountain principalities of Kolāb, Qarātegīn, and Darvāz also remained independent (the last two under Tajik rulers), except for a very brief period in the 1240s-50s/1830s, when they were subjected to Ḵoqand, and lived their own life, being very little connected with the rest of Central Asia.
Attempts at territorial expansion made by the rulers of all three khanates after their internal unification met only with partial success. The least successful was Bukhara. &Scaronāh-Morād captured Marv and installed his own governor, but in 1238/1823 the oasis of Marv, which was now inhabited by Turkmen after having been devastated by wars and its sedentary population having been deported to Bukhara, was lost to Ḵīva. In 1259/1843 wars with Ḵīva over Marv were renewed and continued until 1271/1855, when the local Turk­men became independent from both khanates. &Scaronāh-­Morād also attempted to regain the regions of Afghan Turkestan previously lost to Aḥmad Shah Dorrānī, but without success, and the Amu Darya remained the border with Afghanistan. The frequent wars with Ḵoqand, mainly over Ura-Tübe, were equally unsuc­cessful. In 1258/1842 Amir Naṣr-Allāh, taking advan­tage of a rebellion in Ḵoqand against Moḥammad-ʿAlī Khan, was able to capture the city of Ḵoqand itself but three months later the Bukharans were driven out by popular rebellion. As a final result of these wars the area of the khanate under the Manḡīts was somewhat reduced, rather than enlarged.
The Mings were much more successful. ʿĀlem Khan had conquered Tashkent in 1224/1809, and the posses­sion of this city gave the khanate great advantage both because of the economic importance of Tashkent as a rapidly growing center of trade with Russia and because of its strategic location close to the Kazakh steppe. Soon Tashkent served as a springboard for the expan­sion of the Khanate of Ḵoqand into the steppe. In 1230/1815 ʿOmar Khan conquered Turkestan, which had earlier nominally belonged to Bukhara. Soon after that the entire southern part of the Da&scaront-e Qepčāq, from close to the Syr Darya delta in the west to the Ili river in the east, was incorporated into the khanate. A fortress named Āq Masjed was built in the lower reaches of the Syr Darya controlling the trade routes to Russia from Tashkent, Bukhara, and Ḵᵛārazm. Under Moḥammad-ʿAlī Khan (1238-58/1822-42), son and successor of ʿOmar, the expansion continued even more vigorously. In 1241/1826 troops from Ḵoqand came to Kā&scaronḡar in support of the anti-Chinese rebellion of Jangir (Jahāngīr) Ḵᵛāja. The second campaign into Eastern Turkestan took place in 1246/1830, when Kā&scaronḡar, Yārkand, and Khotan were captured three months later the troops had to return, but the next year, after negotiations with China, Ḵoqand obtained the right to collect customs duties in the six cities of Eastern Turkestan. An offensive against the Kirghiz of the Tien Shan, which began in 1246/1831, had more lasting territorial results: all regions inhabited by the Kirghiz were annexed, and within a few years a number of fortresses were built on the Kirghiz territory and especially along the Chinese border, thus securing the new acquisitions. Similarly, fortresses were built in the Kazakh steppe. In 1250/1834 Moḥammad-ʿAlī Khan also conquered the Tajik mountain principality of Qarātegīn, which remained under authority of Ḵoqand for more than twenty years (during the first ten years together with Darvāz, another mountain principality). By the end of the 1830s the territory occupied by Ḵoqand, although probably not its population, had therefore become larger than that of the other two khanates.
The Khanate of Ḵīva also embarked on territorial expansion from the early years of the Qongrat dynasty. Its main efforts, similar to those of the Mings, were directed toward its nomadic neighbors: Karakalpaks and Kazakhs in the north and Turkmen in the south. The Karakalpaks, most of whom had migrated during the 12th/18th century from the middle course of the Syr Darya to the eastern shores of the Aral Sea and partly to the Amu Darya delta, were subdued in 1226/1811 by Moḥammad-Raḥīm Khan and resettled in the Amu Darya delta. In 1231-37/1816-22, after a series of Khivan military raids, a part of the Kazakhs of the Junior Horde (K&scaroni Žuz), who had their winter pastures between the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya, recognized the authority of the khan of Ḵīva and began to pay zakāt. The expansion into the Kazakh steppe continued under Moḥammad-Raḥīm&rsquos successor, Allāh­qolī Khan (1240-58/1825-42). Several small fortresses were built near the lower reaches of the Syr Darya, based on which the Khivan troops could go far into the steppe collecting zakāt from the Kazakhs of the Junior horde similar expeditions were directed to the Kazakhs nomadizing on the Üst-Yurt plateau, west of the Aral Sea. The main targets of the Khivan expansion, however, remained Khorasan and the Turkmen tribes living along its northern rim. Immediately after the uni­fication of Ḵᵛārazm in 1226/1811 Moḥammad-Raḥīm Khan began a series of almost annual military cam­paigns against Khorasan and the Turkmen, primarily the Teke tribe in Aḵāl and Atak. In his campaigns in Khorasan he sometimes received support from Kurdish khans discontented with the governor of Khorasan, Moḥammad-Walī Mīrzā (the later khans of Ḵīva also used to take advantage of the feuds in Khorasan and received help from some of the local khans). These campaigns, however, were never aimed at territorial acquisitions but were rather marauding raids, and did not penetrate very far into Persian territory. By the end of Moḥammad-Raḥīm Khan&rsquos reign most of the Tekes had to recognize the authority of Ḵīva, and Turkmen would supply soldiers to the Khivan army during its campaigns against Khorasan and pay zakāt (sometimes only when military force was sent to collect it). How­ever, Ḵīva was not able to establish any strongholds in Khorasan (as it had done in the 10th/16th century, when the ʿArab&scaronāhī khans had their appanages there). Raids against Khorasan and the Turkmen continued until 1271/1855 under Allāhqolī Khan and his successors, causing much devastation. During these cam­paigns some Turkmen groups were forcibly brought from Khorasan to Ḵᵛārazm and settled there, while others migrated to Ḵᵛārazm voluntarily, boosting the Turkmen population of the khanate and strengthening the Khivan army, but also increasing the number of potentially unreliable subjects in Ḵᵛārazm itself. The oasis of Marv, inhabited by the Sarïq (Sarēq) and Teke Turkmen, was subdued by Ḵīva in 1239/1823 and was ruled by a Khivan governor, but was again lost in 1259/1843 after the Turkmen rebelled and allied themselves with Bukhara. This caused a war between Ḵīva and Bukhara and a series of raids against Marv and its new submission by Ḵīva in 1265/1849. The submission did not last long, and from 1267/1851 Moḥammad-Amīn Khan was leading annual campaigns against the Turkmen of Marv. The Turkmen received some help from the Qajar governors of Daragaz, who sent a small garrison to Marv, but in 1270/1854 Marv was conquered by the Khivans. Already in 1271/1855, however, the army of Moḥammad-Amīn Khan was routed by the Turkmen when he turned against the Teke of Saraḵs, and the khan was killed. Persian troops under Farīdūn Mīrzā Qajar participated in this battle on the side of the Turkmen, and after the victory Farīdūn Mīrzā installed a Persian governor in Marv. Soon after this a struggle for domination in Marv between the Sarïqs and the Teke began. The Sarïqs were supported by the Persians, but the Teke were victorious. In 1277/1861 a Persian army under Ḥamza Mīrzā Ḥe&scaronmat-al-Dawla was sent against Marv but was totally defeated by the Turkmen under Qow&scaronut Khan. Two years earlier, in 1275/1858, the united forces of the Göklens, the Teke of Aḵāl, and the Yomūts had defeated the Persian army under Jaʿfarqolī Khan near Qarrï-qaʿla (near the Sumbar river). These three victories made the Turkmen tribes of northern Khorasan entirely independent of both Ḵīva and Persia, and all the gains of the previous expansion of Ḵīva into the Turkmen lands were lost.
The lack of political unification of the whole of Central Asia combined with the probably even more important fact that the khanates were incompletely centralized, especially Ḵīva and Ḵoqand with sizeable nomadic and semi-nomadic populations, had serious consequences for the future of the region. While the pro­cess of sedentarization of these groups was accelerated in the 13th/19th century, the khanates were unable to provide irrigated lands to all of them, and struggle between the old sedentary and the newly sedentarized population groups became a major source of instability in Ḵīva and Ḵoqand. The nomads also resented the government&rsquos attempts at tightening the administrative control and increasing their taxes. In addition, the Turkmen of Ḵᵛārazm apparently lost interest in the increasingly unsuccessful and unprofitable military campaigns of Ḵīva. In 1271/1855, after the disaster at Saraḵs, a Turkmen and Karakalpak rebellion began in Ḵᵛārazm, which continued intermittently until 1284/1867 (the Karakalpaks lasted only 6 months). Such protracted hostilities weakened the khanate economically and politically. Substantial parts of lands that had been irrigated in the first half of the century were now devastated and abandoned, and the khanate had to stop all its military ventures in the south. In Ḵoqand the conflicts between the sedentary and the sedentariz­ing groups, especially the Kipčaks, grew even more acute, and after the defeat of Ḵoqand and its brief occupation by the amir of Bukhara in 1258/1842, violent fights between them broke out frequently. For about eight years (1260-68/1844-52) all power in the country belonged to the Kipčaks, who were seizing the lands of the sedentary population and committing numerous acts of violence, until Ḵodāyār Khan (first reign 1261-75/1845-58) organized a coup followed by the massacre of a large number of Kipčaks. This did not, however, put an end to internal feuds in the khanate in the course of which pretenders to the throne were supported by the Kipčaks together with Kirghiz and other nomads, and Ḵodāyār Khan lost his throne twice (1275/1858 and 1280/1863). Meanwhile the Rus­sians had already begun their military advance into Central Asia.
II. The Russian conquest of Central Asia and the first decades of Russian rule.
Direct contacts between Russia and the sedentary states of Central Asia became possible only after the conquest of the khanates of Kazan (1552) and Astra­khan (1556) by Ivan the Terrible. In 1558 Anthony Jenkinson, a representative of the English Muscovy Company, went from Moscow to Ḵīva and Bukhara, trying to find a land route to China and carrying an official message from the tsar to the local rulers. He returned the next year accompanied by envoys from Ḵīva, Bukhara, and Balḵ. This event is usually regarded as the beginning of regular diplomatic exchanges between Russia and the Central Asian khanates. The exchanges were concerned primarily with the questions of trade, as Russia was gradually becoming Central Asia&rsquos main trade partner, but also with the release of Russian subjects captured by Kazakhs and Kalmyks along the Russian borders and by Turkmen on the shores of the Caspian Sea and sold as slaves to the Central Asian khanates. The Russian government constantly tried to obtain their release, but without much success. This did not, however, cause any major crisis in the relations between the two sides before the 13th/19th century. While the relations between Russia and the sedentary khanates were not marred by serious incidents until the early 12th/18th century, Russia&rsquos relations with the Kazakhs, its immediate neighbors, were becoming more and more strained because of the slow encroachment of Russian settlers on the Kazakh pastures along the northern fringes of the Kazakh steppe and frequent exchanges of plundering raids between the Kazakhs and the Russians. In 1715 Peter the Great, prompted by information about the internal feuds in the khanates, as well as rumors of gold deposits found in Central Asia and wishing to find river routes from Central Asia to India, sent two military expeditions: one from Astrakhan to Ḵīva, under the com­mand of Prince Bekovich-Cherkasskiĭ, with a force of about 3,000 men, and another from Tobolsk up the Irtysh river, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Buchholtz, with a detachment of more than 4,000. Both expeditions ended in failure: the Bekovich party was totally annihilated by the Khivans in 1717, while the Buchholtz party was repulsed, with heavy losses, by the (Mongol) Junghars in 1716 near Lake Yamyshevo.
The failure of Peter&rsquos ventures in Central Asia showed that attempts to establish Russian presence in the khanates would be futile as long as they were separated from the Russian territory by hundreds of miles of steppes. Peter the Great himself is said to have realized that the Kazakh horde &ldquois the key and gate to all the Asian countries and lands, and for this reason it is necessary that this horde be under Russian protection&rdquo (Donelly, p. 212). The subsequent Russian governments therefore directed their attention to these steppes and their Kazakh inhabitants, while continuing the usual trade and diplomatic relations with the khanates. In the first quarter of the 18th century, when the Kazakhs were suffering from Junghar raids, the Russian govern­ment took advantage of their difficult situation, as well as the desire of some of the Kazakh rulers to strengthen their own position within the Kazakh society with Russian support and had a number of Kazakh khans and tribal chieftains take an oath of allegiance to Russia between 1731 and 1740. This allegiance remained purely nominal until the end of the 18th century, when the Russian government took steps to transform it into a real submission in order to protect the growing Russian settlements in Western Siberia from Kazakh raids and, especially, to protect the rapidly growing Russian caravan trade with the Central Asian khanates. This could not be accomplished without a political stabilization of the steppe and the establishment of a firm Russian authority there. But here the Russian interests clashed with the interests of the Central Asian khanates, particularly those of Ḵoqand and Ḵīva.
While Russia was expanding southward into the Kazakh steppe, the khanates of Ḵoqand and Ḵīva were simultaneously expanding northward (see above). The expansion of Ḵīva into the territory of the Junior Horde, and especially an active support given by Ḵīva to all Kazakh leaders who did not recognize Russian authority, together with plundering of Russian trade caravans by Khivan troops or by the Kazakhs under the Khivan patronage, as well as the accounts about the Russian slaves in the khanate, increasingly worried and irritated the Russian government. Several years of growing tension resulted in a military expedition against Ḵīva undertaken in winter 1839/40 from Orenburg. It ended in failure: the Russian troops suffered from a severe winter and after heavy losses of men and pack animals they had to turn back. After this setback the Russian government reconsidered its strategy. Attempts at immediate conquest of the Khanate of Ḵīva were abandoned, and instead the Russians strengthened their positions in the steppes and moved them closer to the sedentary areas of Central Asia. This finally made it possible to bring the Kazakhs to submission and created a springboard for the conquest of the khanates. In 1847 the Raimovskoe (from 1851 Aral&rsquoskoe) fortress was built near the Syr Darya delta to serve as a Russian base in the southern part of the steppes, and other fortresses followed. Simultaneously, Russian positions advanced also on the eastern side of the Kazakh steppe, and in 1847 a fortress named Kopal was built in the Samirech&rsquoe region. The Russian advance on the Syr Darya and in the Samirech&rsquoe alarmed the Khoqandians, and in 1852 Khoqandian and Russian troops clashed twice on the Syr Darya. In 1853 Russian troops under Perovskiĭ, governor general of Orenburg, captured Āq Masjed, the Khoqandian stronghold in the lower reaches of the Syr Darya, which was then renamed Fort Perovskiĭ. In the east, the Russians at the same time crossed the Ili and occupied the southern part of the Samirech&rsquoe. In 1854 the fortress Vernoe was founded in this region, later to become the city of Vernyĭ (modern Alma-Ata).
The Russian advance on the Syr Darya and in the Samirech&rsquoe was the beginning of a direct military confrontation between Russia and the Central Asian khanates, which in a short time led to their conquest. The motives for this conquest were manifold, and it is hardly possible to indicate any &ldquomain cause.&rdquo Already in the Russian expansion into the Kazakh steppes political and military considerations (defense of the southern border) were closely connected with commer­cial interests (security of Russian trade caravans). While Russia was gradually annexing the steppes and coming into collision with the Central Asian khanates, new motives for her expansion emerged. Rapid development of Russian industry in the second quarter of the 19th century had no parallel in the growth of the purchasing capacity of the population, a great majority of which, until 1861, were serfs. Therefore Russia needed foreign markets for her industrial goods not less than the more industrialized Western nations. Since these goods were not competitive on the European markets, a natural direction for the Russian trade expansion was to the east, especially to Central Asia, a region with strong traditional commercial ties with Russia. By the mid-19th century, the prevailing opinion in Russian commercial circles was that under the political conditions of Central Asia the only way to ensure the Russian trade interests in that region was to establish Russian rule there or, at least, firm political control. An additional and important argument for such a solution was the grow­ing fear of British trade competition in Central Asia. The advocates of Russian expansion even warned about similar British schemes and demanded that British advance to Central Asia through Afghanistan be fore­stalled by prompt Russian action. It is doubtful that the Russian government at any time took seriously the British threat to Central Asia, but it was used as a justification for the Russian expansion.
Although Russian trade interests in Central Asia figure prominently not only in contemporary Russian writings but also in many official Russian documents, it is not at all certain that the political and military decisions of the Russian government concerning Central Asia were dictated primarily by these economic con­siderations. It seems that Russian global political interests, especially related to the Anglo-Russian rivalry, played an equally, sometimes even more, important role in determining the Russian policy in Central Asia. After its defeat in the Crimean War (1853-56) Russia was eager to restore its military prestige and position among the European powers. It also tended to use its expansion (or threat of expansion) in Central Asia to put pressure on Britain in European affairs.
The Central Asian khanates played only a passive role in the political game in which their future was decided. Their military means to resist the Russian expansion were totally inadequate against the overwhelming military superiority of Russia. The rulers of the khanates, who had little, if any, knowledge of the outside world, did not appreciate the imminent danger and made no serious attempts to join their forces to mount resistance. Sometimes they even tried to avail themselves of the difficult situation of a neighbor pressed by the Russians to snatch a piece of territory for themselves (see below).
It took Russia 22 years from the beginning of the offensive in 1864 to complete the conquest of entire Central Asia south of the Syr Darya, after first occupy­ing all steppe regions in the south that had been under the control of Ḵoqand. Planned already in 1854, the occupation had been delayed by the Crimean War and was not undertaken until 1863. In the meantime the Russians made attempts to achieve some of their goals by peaceful means, especially improving trade con­ditions for the Russian merchants, for which purpose a mission headed by N. P. Ignat&rsquoev was sent to Ḵīva and Bukhara in 1858. The mission gave no results and only strengthened the opinion among the high Russian officials that military action was needed. A broad offensive was preceded by a number of reconnaissance raids in 1858-63, especially to the south of the Ili. In 1863 a considerable part of the mountainous Kirghiz country to the south of Lake Issyk-Kul was annexed to Russia. In 1864 an agreement between Russia and China was signed, in which the frontier line between the two states was established, thus protecting the rear of the Russian troops advancing into the Khanate of Ḵoqand from the east (see Khalfin, 1960, p. 180). In December 1863 the tsar signed a decree requiring that a new border line should be drawn through Sūzak (east of Syr Darya) and Awlīā-Ata (present-day Jambul in Kazakhstan) and later even farther south, adding Chimkent (in southern Kazakhstan) and Turkestan to the Russian territory. The Khanate of Ḵoqand, the first target of the Russian offensive, took belated measures to strengthen its defenses in Tashkent and in the steppe regions. The Russian troops set out in May 1864 from the Syr Darya line and the Trans-Ili region and had little difficulty in capturing Turkestan and Awlīā-Ata. The establishment of the &ldquoNew Khoqandian&rdquo line was announced, and Major-General M. G. Chernyaev was appointed its commander. Chernyaev continued the offensive, but in July 1864 he was repelled from Chimkent, which was defended by the ruler of Ḵoqand Mollā ʿĀlem-qul. Soon after this, however, the army of Bukhara invaded the Farḡāna valley, ʿĀlem-qul had to leave Chimkent, and Chernyaev, seizing the opportunity, went in and in September 1864 captured the city. A week later he moved against Tashkent, but here, too, he was repelled by the Khoqandian garrison.
A short period of consolidation of the Russian conquests followed, during which the Russian govern­ment began to reorganize the annexed territories. In January 1865, all territories captured from Ḵoqand, from the Aral Sea to Lake Issyk-Kul, were united in one Turkestan oblast, and Chernyaev became its first military governor. He pursued his plans of capturing Tashkent, taking advantage of a new military campaign of the amir of Bukhara against Ḵoqand, and especially of the dissent among the population of Tashkent, where a pro-Russian party had been formed led by influential merchants interested in peace and trade with Russia. In May 1865, in a battle near Tashkent, the troops of Ḵoqand were defeated and Mollā ʿĀlem-qul killed. On 2 Ṣafar/27 June Chernyaev stormed the city, and on 4 Ṣafar/29 June it surrendered to the Russians. For a year after this the Russian government was considering the idea of creating an &ldquoindependent&rdquo Tashkent khanate, but this plan proved infeasible, and in August 1866 the annexation of Tashkent was pro­claimed by a decree from the tsar.
Already before the formal annexation of Tashkent, the relations between Russia and the Khanate of Bukhara had become very tense. The invasion of Farḡāna in the summer of 1865 by Amir Moẓaffar-al-­Dīn and his arrival at Ḵoqand aroused Russian sus­picions about a possible joint action of Bukhara and Ḵoqand against the Russians in Tashkent. The amir demanded that the Russians withdraw from Tashkent, and in response all Bukharan merchants on the territory of the Turkestan region and the governorate-general of Orenburg were arrested and their goods sequestered. In the fall of 1865 skirmishes began between Russian and Bukharan troops to the south of Tashkent. In January-February 1866 Chernyaev crossed the Syr Darya and tried to capture the Bukharan town of Jīzak the operation failed, and Chernyaev was recalled to St. Petersburg and replaced by General D. I. Romanovskiĭ. In May 1866, in the locality of Īrjār, the Bukharan army under the command of the amir himself was defeated and fled. The battle was followed by the capture of Ḵojand, the key to the Farḡāna valley (a part of the Khanate of Ḵoqand, which did not take part in the hostilities). Ḵojand was officially annexed to Russia together with Tashkent in August 1866, and the Khanate of Ḵoqand was thus reduced to the Farḡāna valley. The Russians submitted to Bukhara their conditions for peace, which were deliberately made unacceptable, and when the amir failed to comply the Russian troops resumed the offensive and took Ura-Tübe and Jīzak (in October 1866) and Yani­-Qurghan (in May 1867).
In July 1867 the Russian government decided how the conquered territories were to be organized: a new governorate-general of Turkestan, with the center in Tashkent, was created, which comprised all lands conquered by the Russians in Central Asia since 1847 and was subdivided into two oblasts, Syr Darya and Semirech&rsquoe. A year later, an administrative reform of the steppe regions was carried out it divided the Kazakh territories into four regions, two of which were subordinate to the governor-general of Orenburg, and the other two to the governor-general of Western Siberia. This reform, together with the transfer of the Russian customs border from the old Orenburg-Irtysh line that had taken place two years earlier, marked the final annexation of the Kazakh steppe. The first Governor-General of Turkestan, who replaced Romanovskiĭ, was General A. P. von Kaufman. He was given almost unlimited authority, including the right to wage wars, conduct diplomatic negotiations, and conclude conventions and treaties with the neighboring states at his own discretion. This extraordinary power and the pomp with which he surrounded himself in Tashkent gained him the nickname &ldquoHalf-Emperor&rdquo (Yarïm Pāde&scaronāh) among the population of Central Asia.
In January 1868 Kaufman imposed a commercial convention on Ḵoqand, which guaranteed the Russian merchants various privileges and symbolized the end of hostilities between the khanate and Russia (no formal peace treaty was concluded). In April 1868, Amir Moẓaffar-al-Dīn, yielding to the militant mullahs of Bukhara and Samarkand, proclaimed holy war against Russia. On 1 May Kaufman defeated Bukharan troops on the Čopān-Ata heights near Samarkand, and the next day Samarkand fell. On 2 June the army of Bukhara under the amir was again utterly defeated on Zīrabūlāq heights, after which the amir capitulated. On 9 Rabīʿ I/30 June he signed the peace conditions submitted by Kaufman. The khanate recognized the loss of all territories conquered by the Russians, agreed to pay war indemnity, and opened the country to the Russian merchants with the same provisions that had been established with the Khanate of Ḵoqand earlier. Although no formal clauses recognizing the Russian protectorate and limiting the sovereignty of the khanates were included in the 1868 treaties with either Ḵoqand or Bukhara, in fact they were both at the mercy of the Russians and had to comply with their demands. After the defeat of Bukhara, Russian attention was focused on Ḵīva. At the end of 1869 a detachment of Russian troops from Caucasus landed in Krasnovodsk Bay, on the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea, where they founded the city of Krasnovodsk. During 1287-89/1870-72 several expeditions crossed the deserts both from the west and east in the direction of Ḵīva to reconnoiter. The khan of Ḵīva, Moḥammad-Raḥīm II (from 1281/1864), and his advisers showed a total lack of under­standing of the situation and claimed the Syr Darya as Ḵīva&rsquos frontier, protested the Russian landing at Krasnovodsk, and supported the Kazakh revolt against the Russians on the Mangï&scaronlaq (Manḡe&scaronlāq). In the spring of 1290/1873, Russian troops under Kaufman set out against Ḵīva from Tashkent, Orenburg, and two points on the Caspian coast. They met with little resis­tance, and on 13 Rabīʿ II/10 June Ḵīva was captured, and Moḥammad-Raḥīm Khan surrendered to Kauf­man. Kaufman remained with his troops in Ḵīva for two and a half months, and in July he launched a brutal punitive raid against Khivan Turkmen, slaughtering hundreds of them and destroying their settlements. On 29 Jomādā II 1290/24 August 1873, Kaufman signed a treaty with Moḥammad-Raḥīm Khan, who in its first article declared himself the &ldquoobedient servant&rdquo of the Russian emperor and renounced his right to conduct independent foreign relations. Russia annexed the whole territory of the khanate on the right bank of the Amu Darya, as well as the entire Üst-Yurt plateau. Navigation on the Amu Darya was put under total control of Russia. The khanate was opened to Russian trade, and Russian subjects residing there received special legal status. The khanate had to pay a huge war indemnity.
Shortly after the conclusion of the treaty with Ḵīva, another was concluded with Bukhara, according to which Bukhara, while giving Russia some additional privileges in the khanate, still preserved its formal sovereignty. The Khanate of Ḵoqand, on the contrary, ceased to exist very soon. As a result of a popular discontent with the oppressive rule of Ḵodāyār Khan, disturbances began in the Farḡāna valley already in 1290-91/1873-74, which were suppressed by the khan, but in 1292/1875 a rebellion broke out under a religious leader who assumed the name of Polād Khan. The rebellion swiftly gained scope, was joined by the troops and local leaders, and assumed an anti-Russian character. Kaufman moved the Russian army into Farḡāna, put down the rebellion, had Polād Khan executed, and the Khanate of Ḵoqand was abolished on 5 Ṣafar 1293/2 February 1876 it was annexed to the governorate-general of Turkestan as Farḡāna oblast.
After the reduction of Bukhara, Ḵīva, and Ḵoqand, the turn came to the Turkmen. Having established themselves on the Mangï&scaronlaq and in Krasnovodsk, the Russians advanced gradually into the Turkmen territory. First they were met mostly friendly by the coastal Turkmen, but very soon the behavior of the Russian troops, especially requisitions of great numbers of camels, tents, and food from the Turkmen, caused grow­ing resistance. In August 1879 a Russian expeditionary force under General A. A. Lomakin was repelled with heavy losses from the fortress of Gök-Tepe (near modern Ashkhabad), which was defended by the Teke Turkmen. A new campaign against the Teke started in 1880 under General M. D. Skobelev, who in January 1881 stormed Gök-Tepe after a three-week-long siege. About 15,000 Teke Turkmen were killed, and their resistance was broken. The oasis of Aḵāl was annexed to Russia and, together with the lands on the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea that had been annexed earlier, formed the Transcaspian oblast subordinate to the vicegerent of the Caucasus. At the end of 1881 Russia signed a convention with Persia establishing the frontiers between the two states (see boundaries ii). The Turkmen of Marv, intimidated by the advance of a Russian military detachment in their direction, at the end of 1883 decided to accept the Russian sovereignty, and Marv was occupied by the Russians in March 1884. The Iolatan and Pende (Panjdeh) oases, further up the Morḡāb river, were annexed in the same year. The Russian frontier with Afghanistan between the Tejen (Harīrūd) and the Amu Darya was finally established in 1887 (see boundaries iii). The end of the Russian expansion in Central Asia was marked by the agreements between Russia and China in 1894 and between Russia and England in 1895, which established the boundaries in the Pamirs and secured most of this mountainous country for the Russian empire.
Administration of the conquered territories under­went several modifications (the most important in 1886) and received its final form only in 1899 it has remained unchanged until 1917. Since 1899 the governorate­-general of Turkestan consisted of five regions: Syr Darya, Farḡāna, Samarkand, Semirech&rsquoe, and Trans­caspia the regions of Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk formed the governorate-general of the Steppe, and the regions of Turgaĭ and Ural&rsquosk were subordinate to the minister of the interior. Following the pattern of the administrative structure in the rest of Russia, the regions were subdivided into uezds and the uezds into volost&rsquos. The administration was military in character, however, and the governor-general was always a serving general subject to the war ministry (in the Steppe governorate-general, to the ministry of the interior). The governors of the oblasts and the &ldquouezd commandants&rdquo were also military officers. All governors were both heads of the civil administration and commanders of troops quartered in their respective provinces. The administration of the lower units, heads of volost&rsquos and elders of the kishlaks (villages), were natives elected by popular vote. Officially this system was called &ldquomilitary-­popular administration&rdquo (voenno-narodnoe upravlenie) it resulted, on one hand, from the Russian government&rsquos belief that only firm military rule could keep the country in the hands of the Russians, by far outnumbered by the natives, and, on the other hand, from the desire to make the local administration as inexpensive as possible. Despite the efforts of a few able and devoted Russian officials, the general level of the administration of Turkestan was low even by the average Russian standards and was notorious for its malpractice and corruption.
The khanates of Bukhara and Ḵīva each had a special status. Bukhara did not officially become a Russian protectorate, and its amir was treated by the Russian government as an independent ruler. Amir ʿAbd-al-­Aḥad (1302-28/1885-1910) even played a visible role in Russian society, visiting Russia annually and being received at court in St. Petersburg. Until 1888 official relations between the khanate and Russia were con­ducted as before the Russian conquest, through the exchange of occasional embassies between Bukhara and Tashkent. Only in 1888 was the Russian Political Agency in Bukhara established, which gave the political agent a dual responsibility, to the foreign ministry in St. Petersburg and to the governor-general in Tashkent. Greater control of the khanate came with the construc­tion of the railroad through its territory and the establishment of Russian border posts on the Amu Darya, which also became Russia&rsquos customs border in 1895 (see also bukhara iii). The Khanate of Ḵīva never enjoyed even a semblance of independence. All relations between the khanate and Russia were conducted through the commandant of the Amu Darya district (otdel) in Petroaleksandrovsk. The khan was not treated by the Russians as an independent ruler and did not often visit Russia. The reasons for the lower status of the Khanate of Ḵīva and its ruler under the Russian power were the difference in the circumstances of the conquest of Bukhara and Ḵīva and Ḵīva&rsquos lesser economic and strategic importance. The two protectorates had one thing in common, however: the Russian government did not interfere in their internal affairs and administration, being content as long as peace was preserved, the rulers were in full command, and the legal rights of Russian subjects, especially merchants, were observed. The entire administrative and social structure of the khanates also remained unchanged, except that their armies were reduced and slavery was abolished. This policy of nonintervention attracted severe criticism, both from Russian liberals, who blamed the government for supporting backward despotic regimes within the Russian empire, and from many Russian officials in Turkestan, who, using the same arguments, demanded the annexation of Bukhara and Ḵīva, but the Russian government consistently rejected such demands, being reluctant to shoulder the financial burden of the administration of the khanates.
The Russian rule in Central Asia most of all affected its economy, though the changes did not occur over­night. At first the Russian administration did not interfere much with existing conditions, except in matters of security and general political issues, and for two decades the old system of landownership and taxes remained almost unchanged. Reforms were finally introduced by the statute of 1886 (see above), which called for the restructuring of the administration. In the sedentary areas, the land was proclaimed the property of those who cultivated it, &ldquoaccording to the custom.&rdquo The measure was of course political, intended to undermine the economic and social positions of the landed aristocracy, which as a rule was the section of the local population most hostile to the Russians (the waqfs, however, were not touched). Taxes were simplified and somewhat lessened. The system of land tenure, however, did not change significantly: most farmers were small owners, and various sharecrop systems were widespread. Contemporary Russian reports pointed out that farmers&rsquo lands were increasingly parceled out and the land concentrated in the hands of the wealthy, a process caused especially by the growth of the market economy and the cotton production.
Demand in Russia for Central Asian cotton had increased sharply during the 1860s as a result of the Civil War in the United States, the main supplier of cotton until then. However, Central Asian cotton, being of inferior quality, could not replace American cotton, and, although its consumption in Russia continued to grow slowly after the Civil War, it could no longer compete with the American product: in the mid-1880s Central Asia supplied only 15 percent of Russia&rsquos cotton needs. In the early 1880s, however, American cotton was introduced to Central Asia, and from 1884 to 1889, only five years, the area planted with American cotton became twice as large as the area under the local variety. At the beginning of the 20th century, more than a half of the total income from the agricultural production of Russian Turkestan (that is, without the khanates) came from cotton, and Central Asia supplied 50 percent of Russia&rsquos cotton needs. Thus, Central Asia was on the road to becoming a land of one-crop agriculture, especially Farḡāna, whose cotton acreage was about two thirds of the total for the governorate-general of Turkestan. Russian influence on the development of other areas of agriculture was much less and was seen not so much in technical improvements as in the introduction of new or improved crops and the expan­sion of existing ones, such as the introduction of sugar beets and the Chinese variety of rice, as well as grapes for making wine. The Russian administration also had little success with the construction of irrigation works: two big projects, the irrigation of the Hunger Steppe, south of Tashkent, and the Imperial Estate in the Morḡāb oasis, gave only meager results. The local population was left to its own devices in building and maintaining the irrigation system, and no innovations were introduced by the Russians.
The industrial development of Central Asia under Russian rule was less dramatic than the changes in agriculture but was of great importance for the social and political life of the country. The basis for this development was provided by the railroads, the first of which, from Mikhaĭlovskiĭ Bay on the Caspian Sea to Kizil-Arvat (about 150 miles) was built in 1881 by Skobelev for strategic purposes. Only in 1885 was it extended to Ashkhabad. The railroad acquired com­mercial importance only by the end of the 1890s, when it was extended to Tashkent, with a branch line to Farḡāna. In the early 20th century a number of other branch lines were added, and in 1906 the railroad from Orenburg to Tashkent was completed. The railroads gave a tremendous boost to cotton growing, making the transport of the Central Asian crop to the textile centers in European Russia many times cheaper and faster. The railroads also contributed to the development of indus­try in the cities they connected. Beside the workshops servicing the railroad itself, the emerging Central Asian industry was limited mainly to the initial processing of cotton and other agricultural products more than 80 percent of all enterprises were cotton-ginning mills. The first native enterprise appeared in 1886, and before World War I almost two thirds of the enterprises were owned by the locals. They were of small size and poorly equipped, but their importance for the political future of Central Asia probably outweighed their economic role. About 80 percent of all skilled workers (on the railroads practically 100 percent) were Russians, and this social group, new in Central Asia, was especially susceptible to the socialist propaganda brought from European Russia at the beginning of the 20th century.
Skilled workers formed only a small part of the growing European population of Central Asia. Colonization of the country started already in the course of the Russian expansion, but it affected mostly the steppe regions. In the southern parts of Central Asia, where arable lands were usually available only after prior irrigation works, there was little possibility for Russian farmers to settle, and with few exceptions the authorities were reluctant to allow it. Here the flow of Russian settlers was directed almost exclusively to the cities. Only two cities in these regions were founded by the Russians: Skobelev (now Fergana) and Petroalek­sandrovsk. Elsewhere in the densely populated areas annexed from the khanates the Russians would add a &ldquoRussian part&rdquo to a city next to the &ldquonative&rdquo or &ldquoAsian&rdquo one. The most important of these Russian urban enclaves were the Russian &ldquoparts&rdquo of Tashkent and Samarkand. Russian Tashkent played a special role in Central Asia as it was the European colonists&rsquo principal intellectual center. Its life was very much isolated from the local population, however, and affected it only superficially. On the whole Russian influence made itself much more strongly felt in administration and economy than in general culture, and in the khanates of Bukhara and Khiva it was even more limited because of the Russian policy of nonintervention (see above).
Literature cited in the text: ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān Ṭāleʿ, Tārīḵ-e Abu&rsquol-Fayż Ḵān, tr. A. A. Semenov, Tashkent, 1959.
M. A. Abdurai­mov, Ocherki agrarnykh otnosheniĭ v Bukharskom khanstve v XVI&mdashpervoĭ polovine XIX veka I, Tash­kent, 1966.
B. A. Akhmedov, Istoriya Balkha (XVI­&mdashpervaya polovina XVIII v., Tashkent, 1982.
V. V. Bartol&rsquod, &ldquoIstoriya kul&rsquoturnoĭ zhizni Turkestana,&rdquo in his Sochineniya II/1, Moscow, 1963, pp. 257-433.
Yu. Bregel, &ldquoThe Sarts in the Khanate of Khiva,&rdquo Journal of Asian History 12/2, 1978, pp. 120-51.
Idem, &ldquoBukhara iii-iv,&rdquo in EIr. IV/5, 1989, pp. 515-24.
O. D. Chekhovich, &ldquoO nekotorykh voprosakh istorii Sred­neĭ Azii XVIII-XIX vekov,&rdquo Voprosy istorii, 1956, no. 3, pp. 84-95.
E. A. Davidovich, Istoriya monet­nogo dela Sredneĭ Azii XVII-XVIII vv., Dushanbe, 1964.
A. S. Donnelly, &ldquoPeter the Great and Central Asia,&rdquo Canadian Slavonic Papers 17, 1975, pp. 202­-17.
N. A. Khalfin, Politika Rossii v Sredneĭ Azii (1857-1868), Moscow, 1960.
Mīr ʿAbd-al-Karīm Boḵārī, ed. Ch. Schefer, Histoire de l&rsquoAsie centrale, Paris, 1876.
Mīrzā Mahdī Khan Astarābādī, Tārīḵ-e jahāngo&scaronā-ye nāderī, Tabrīz, 1266/1849-50.
Idem, Dorra-ye nāderī, ed. S. J. &Scaronahīdī, Tehran, 1341 &Scaron./1962.
Moḥammad-Kāẓem, ʿĀlamārā-ye nāderī, Moscow, 1965 ed. M.-A. Rīāḥī, 3 vols., Tehran, 1364 &Scaron./1985.
Moḥammad-Wafā Karmīnagī, Toḥfat al-ḵānī, ms. of the Leningrad Branch of the Institute of Oriental Studies C 525. Moʾnes and Āgahī, Ferdaws al-eqbāl, ed. Yu. Bregel, Leiden, 1988.
Nīāz-­Moḥammad Ḵūqandī, Tārīḵ-e &scaronāhroḵī, Kazan, 1885.
V. V. Vel&rsquoyaminov-Zernov, Istoricheskie izvestiya o kirgiz-kaĭsakakh i snosheniyakh Rossii s Sredneĭ Azieĭ II, Ufa, 1855.
Idem, &ldquoMonety bukharskie i khivin­skie,&rdquo in Trudy Vostochnogo otdeleniya Imp. Russ­kogo arkheologicheskogo obshchestva 4, 1858, pp. 328-456.
Other sources: For references to indigenous sour­ces for the history of Central Asia in the 18th-20th centuries written in Bukhara and other Central Asian cities/khanates see individual articles. Historical works written in Russian Turkestan by local writers in Persian and Turkic are few and insignificant the only notable exception is Moḥammad-Ṣāleḥ Ḵᵛāja Tā&scaronkandī&rsquos Tārīḵ-e jadīda-ye Tā&scaronkand (unpublished, see Storey-Bregel, pp. 1199-1200).
Only a fraction of the Russian documentary material, mostly preserved in the archives of Moscow, Leningrad and, for the period after the Russian conquest also in Tashkent, Alma-Ata, Dushanbe, Ashkhabad, Frunze, and Orenburg, has till now been utilized, let alone pub­lished. The most important publication of Russian documents on the conquest of Central Asia is A. G. Serebrennikov, Turkestanskiĭ kraĭ. Sbornik materia­lov dlya istorii ego zavoevaniya, vols. 2-8, 17-22, Tash­kent, 1914-16 (other volumes remain unpublished in archives in Tashkent).
An equally important publication for the period of Russian rule is [K. K. Pahlen], Otchet po revizii Turkestanskogo kraya, proizvedennoĭ po vysochaĭshemu poveleniyu senato­rom gofmeĭsterom grafom K. K. Palenom, 19 vols., St. Petersburg, 1909-11.
Studies: General works: P. P. Ivanov, Ocherki po istorii Sredneĭ Azii (XVI&mdashseredina XIX v.), Moscow, 1958 (the only existing work in Soviet literature that treats the history of Central Asia as one historical entity). Istoriya narodov Uzbekistana II, Tashkent, 1947.
Istoriya Uzbekskoĭ SSR I/1-2, Tashkent, 1955-­56.
Istoriya tadzhikskogo naroda II/2, Moscow, 1964. (The three last works are based on primary sources for the period before the Russian conquest, but references are mostly not given.)
A. Z. V. Togan, Bugünkü Türkili (Türkistan) ve yakın tarihi I: Batı ve kuzey Türkistan, Istanbul, 1942-47.
G. Wheeler, The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia, London, 1964.
O. D. Chekhovich, &ldquoK istorii Uzbekistana v XVIII v.,&rdquo in Trudy Instituta vostokovedeniya AN Uzbekskoĭ SSR III, Tashkent, 1954, pp. 43-82.
Idem, &ldquoK voprosu o periodizatsii istorii Uzbekistana (XVI-­XVIII vv.),&rdquo Izvestiya Akademii nauk Uzbekskoĭ SSR, 1954, no. 5, pp. 101-09.
L. Tillett, The Great Friendship. Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities, Chapel Hill, 1969 (includes very valuable study of Soviet writings on the history of Russian conquest and rule of Central Asia, showing the unreliability of these writings).
Relations with Russia and Russian conquest (Central Asia in general). The most detailed, although badly organized, account is M. A. Terent&rsquoev, Istoriya zavoevaniya Sredneĭ Azii I-III, St. Petersburg, 1906 (contains most of the facts used in later publications on this subject).
Other works: E. Allworth, ed., Central Asia. A Century of Russian Rule, New York, 1967. E. V. Bunakov, &ldquoK istorii snosheṇĭ Rossii s srendneaziatskimi khanstvami v XIX v.,&rdquo in Sovetskoe vostokovedenie II, Moscow and Leningrad, 1941, pp. 5-26.
N. A. Khalfin, Prisoedinenie Sredneĭ Azii k Rossii, Moscow, 1965.
Idem, Rossiya i khanstva Sredneĭ Azii (Pervaya polovina XIX veka), Moscow, 1974.
Idem, Rossiya i Bukharskiĭ èmirat na Zapadnom Pamire (konets XIX&mdashnachalo XX v.), Moscow, 1975. (Khalfin uses and cites valuable archival material but is extremely biased, especially in his emphasis on the British threat to Central Asia and the beneficial consequences of the Russian annexation the same is true&mdashto varying degree&mdashof all other Soviet works on the subject written after 1950.)
N. S. Kinyapina, &ldquoSrednyaya Aziya vo vneshnepolitiches­kikh planakh tsarizma (50-80-e gody XIX veka),&rdquo Voprosy istorii, 1974, no. 2, pp. 36-51.
L. F. Kostenko, Srednyaya Aziya i vodvorenie v neĭ russkoĭ grazhdan­stvennosti, St. Petersburg, 1871.
A. I. Maksheev, Istoricheskiĭ obzor Turkestana i nastupatel&rsquonogo dvi­zheniya v nego russkikh, St. Petersburg, 1890.
G. Morgan, Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia 1810-­1895, London, 1981.
P. I. Nebol&rsquosin, Ocherki torgovli Rossii s stranami Sredneĭ Azii, Khivoĭ, Bukharoĭ i Kokanom (So storony Orenburgskoĭ linii), St. Peters­burg, 1855.
A. L. Popov, &ldquoIz istorii zavoevaniya Sredneĭ Azii,&rdquo in Istoricheskie zapiski IX, Moscow, 1940, pp. 198-242.
M. K. Rozhkova, Èkonomicheskie svyazi Rossii so Sredneĭ Azieĭ 40-e&mdash60-e gody XIX v., Moscow, 1963.
J. W. Strong, &ldquoThe Ignat&rsquoev Mis­sion to Khiva and Bukhara in 1858,&rdquo Canadian Slavonic Papers 17, 1975, pp. 236-60.
S. V. Zhukov­skiĭ, Snosheniya Rossii s Bukharoĭ i Khivoĭ za posled­nee trekhsotletie, Petrograd, 1915 (review V. V. Bar­tol&rsquod, in Sochineniya II/2, 1964, pp. 419-22).
On the period of Russian rule (until 1917) the best general work is R. Pierce, Russian Central Asia. A Study in Colonial Rule, Berkeley, 1960. Other works: A. M. Aminov, Èkonomicheskoe razvitie Sredneĭ Azii. So vtoroĭ poloviny XIX stoletiya do pervoĭ mirovoĭ voĭny, Tashkent, 1959.
F. Azadaev, Tashkent vo vtoroĭ polovine XIX veka. Ocherki sotsial&rsquono­-èkonomicheskoĭ i politicheskoĭ istorii, Tashkent, 1959.
S. Becker, Russia&rsquos Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924, Cambridge, Mass., 1968.
M. Batunsky, &ldquoImperial Pragmatism, Liberalistic Culture Relativism and Assimilatively Christianizing Dogmatism in Colonial Central Asia: Parallels, Divergencies, Mergences,&rdquo in Utrecht Papers on Central Asia: Proceedings of the First European Seminar on Central Asian Studies Held at Utrecht, 16-18 December 1985, Utrecht, 1987, pp. 95­-122.
H. Carrère d&rsquoEncausse, &ldquoLa politique culturelle du pouvoir tsariste au Turkestan (1867-1917),&rdquo in Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique 3, 1963, pp. 374-407.
P. G. Galuzo, Turkestan&mdashkoloniya (Ocherk istorii Turkestana ot zavoevaniya russkimi do revolyu­tsii 1917 g.), Moscow, 1929.
D. Mackenzie, &ldquoKauf­man of Turkestan: An Assessment of His Administration (1867-1881),&rdquo Slavic Review 26, 1967, pp. 265-­85.
L. P. Morris, &ldquoThe Russians in Central Asia 1870-1887,&rdquo Slavic and East European Review 53, 1975, pp. 521-38.
M. Sarkisyanz, &ldquoRussian Conquest in Central Asia: Transformation and Acculturation,&rdquo in W. S. Vucinich, ed., Russia and Asia: Essays on the Influence of Russian on the Asian Peoples, Stan­ford, 1972, pp. 248-88.
M. P. Vyatkin, Sotsial&rsquono-èkonomicheskoe razvitie Sredneĭ Azii (Istoriografi­cheskiĭ ocherk 1865-1965 gg.), Frunze, 1974.
Chinese Occupation of Mongolia and Tarim Basin, Arabs defeat Sassanians, Umayyad Caliphate established, Chinese expelled from Mongolia, Arabs capture Central Asian oasis cities, Chinese invade Ferghana Valley, Battle of Talas River between Arabs and Chinese, Kirghiz/Uighur strife, Uighurs move to Tarim Basin, Samanids defeat Saffarids in Persia
The Asian century is set to begin
Economists, political scientists and emerging market pundits have been talking for decades about the coming of the Asian Age, which will supposedly mark an inflection point when the continent becomes the new centre of the world.
Asia is already home to more than half the world’s population. Of the world’s 30 largest cities, 21 are in Asia, according to UN data.y next year, Asia will also become home to half of the world’s middle class, defined as those living in households with daily per capita incomes of between $10 and $100 at 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP).
Since 2007, Asians have been buying more cars and trucks than people in any other region — by about 2030 they will be buying as many vehicles as the rest of the world combined, according to LMC Automotive.
Leaders in the region are beginning to talk more openly about the shift. “Now the continent finds itself at the centre of global economic activity,” Narendra Modi, prime minister of India, told the last annual meeting of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. “It has become the main growth engine of the world. In fact, we are now living through what many have termed the Asian Century,” he said.
So when will the Asian Age actually begin?
The Financial Times tallied the data, and found that Asian economies, as defined by the UN trade and development body Unctad, will be larger than the rest of the world combined in 2020,ਏor the first time since the 19th century. The Asian century, the numbers show, begins next year.
To put this in perspective, Asia accounted for just over a third of world output in 2000.
To make its calculations, the FT examined IMF data based on gross domestic product after adjusting for price differences in different countries. This method, which assesses economies by PPP, is widely considered the most relevant measure as it takes into account what people can actually buy in developing countries where prices are often cheaper.
Even at market exchange value, Asia still accounts for 38 per cent of global output, up from 26 per cent in the early 2000s.
What lies behind Asia’s economic eclipse of the rest of the world? The rise of China and India explains a large part of this trend. China is now a bigger economy at PPP than the US, accounting for 19 per cent of world output this year, more than double the 7 per cent recorded in 2000. India is now the world’s third-largest economy, with a GDP about double the size of either Germany or Japan, both of which had economies larger than India’s on a PPP basis in 2000.
The world’s imminent entry to an Asian age is coming not just because of its two largest economies, but also thanks to growth among smaller and midsize countries.
Indonesia is on track to become the world’s seventh-largest economy at PPP by 2020, and will have overtaken Russia by 2023 as the sixth biggest.
Vietnam, one of Asia’s fastest-growing economies, has overtaken 17 countries in a ranking of economies in PPP terms since 2000, including Belgium and Switzerland. The Philippines is now a larger economy than the Netherlands while Bangladesh has overtaken 13 other economies in the past 20 years.
Asia’s recent surge, which began with Japan’s postwar economic surge, represents a return to a historical norm. Asia dominated the world economy for most of human history until the 19th century.
𠇊round the end of the 17th century, Europe was looking with admiration and envy at a region of the globe which concentrated . . . more than two-thirds of the world’s gross domestic product, and three-quarters of the world’s population,” said Andrea Colli, professor of economic history at Bocconi University in Italy.
In the 18th century, India’s share of the world economy was as big as Europe’s, according to Indian politician and author Shashi Tharoor.
Then, for three centuries, Asia’s place in the world shrank as western economies took off, powered by what academics refer to as the Scientific Revolution, then the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution.
“What you are looking at is the great reversal,” says Joel Mokyr, professor at Northwestern University. tween 1500 and 1750 Europe changed dramatically the rest of the world did not.”
By the 1950s, Asia accounted for less than 20 per cent of world output, despite hosting more than half the world’s population.
“In the 19th century, Asia was transformed from the world’s manufacturing centre into classic underdeveloped economies exporting agricultural commodities,” said Bob Allen, professor of economic history at NYU, Abu Dhabi, who was formerly at the University of Oxford.
But in recent decades that trend has been reversed.
The dramatic rise of Japan and South Korea, the first countries in Asia to catch up with the west, has been 𠇍warfed” by China’s take-off following the country’s introduction of market-oriented reforms under Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s.
In just a couple of generations, a “winning mix of integration with the global economy via trade and foreign direct investment, high savings rates, large investments in human and physical capital, and sound macroeconomic policies” contributed to Asia’s economic leap forward, according to the IMF’s latest regional outlook compiled by a team led by Koshy Mathai.
“The west&aposs two-century epoch as global powerhouse is at an end,” argues Kishore Mahbubani in his latestook “Has the West Lost It?”
Over the past five decades, hundreds of millions of people in Asia have been lifted out of poverty and many Asian economies have graduated to middle-income or advanced economic status, according to World Bank definitions.
Asia remains poorer than the rest of the world, but the gap is narrowing. China’s GDP per capita at PPP is still only about one-third of that of the US, and about 44 per cent of that of the EU. India has a GDP per capita at PPP of only about 20 per cent that of the EU, according to IMF data.
But India and China’s per-capita income gap with the US and Europe has narrowed dramatically since 2000. Over that period,hina has become nearly five times richer than the average per capita output of sub-Saharan Africa. The two regions were at similar levels in the mid-1990s.
By any measure, Asia is about to reoccupy the centre of the global economic stage. When it does, “the world will have come full circle”, Profਊllen said.
South Asia: 19th Century and Earlier Imprints
The South Asia Collection at Hamilton Library began with the Oriental Institute in 1932, initially acquiring materials on Sanskrit, Indian philosophy, and religion. Today, the collection is rich in resources about South Asia from the 18th, 19, and 20th centuries, and filled with treasures on a variety of subjects, including history, travel writing, and literature. Several of these are rare items, held in the Special Research Collection, such as Views of India, an album of fifty-four water-color views of architectural sites at Agra, Delhi, and Mathura Thomas Pennant’s Indian Zoology, a beautifully illustrated volume on animals and birds on the subcontinent travel accounts by William Hodges, who accompanied Captain Cook on his second voyage and art prints of Hindu icons by Atul Basu, a Calcutta (Kolkatta) artist, active in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
While rare materials and original documents, in any form, are a prized feature of library collections, the South Asia collection actively works to make its holdings digitally accessible. This project begins to collect all the materials that belong to collections of Hamilton Library at the University of Hawaii at Mānoa that fit the title content, South Asia: 19th Century and Earlier Imprints.
All items in this digital collection are in the public domain. Each item includes title pages, table of contents, and, when available, prefatory notes, selected illustrations and text. Links will be provided to the catalog record, and to full text sites, if available. Full text will be provided through E-Vols, if unavailable elsewhere. This project is ongoing with regular additions to the content.